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Abstract 
A collision avoidance algorithm is developed and implemented that is applicable 
to different types of unmanned aerial systems ranging from a single platform with the 
ability to perform all collision avoidance functions independently to multiple vehicles 
performing functions as a cooperative group with collision avoidance commands 
computed at a ground station. The algorithm draws on the unique benefits of several 
theoretical approaches to conflict detection and resolution and combines them into one 
algorithm while addressing the limitations of those individual methods. Techniques and 
concepts from the three theoretical fields of robotics, homing guidance, and airspace 
management are used to complete the algorithm. The algorithm is developed with a focus 
on current Air Force systems used in route surveillance missions in hostile environments. 
The collision avoidance system is exercised and tested using hardware and platforms 
from the Advanced Navigation Technology Center at the Air Force Institute of 
Technology.  
The results presented are the first known flight tests of a global, three-
dimensional, geometric collision avoidance system on an unmanned aircraft system. 
Novel developments using an aggregated collision cone approach allows each unmanned 
aircraft to detect and avoid collisions with one or more other aircraft simultaneously. The 
collision avoidance system is implemented using a miniature unmanned aircraft with an 
onboard autopilot. Various simulation and flight test cases are used to demonstrate the 
algorithm’s robustness to different collision encounters at various engagement angles. 
The flight test results are compared with ideal, software-in-the-loop, and hardware-in-the-
loop tests. 
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UAS COLLISION AVOIDANCE ALGORITHM THAT MINIMIZES THE 
IMPACT ON ROUTE SURVEILLANCE 
 
 
I. Introduction 
1. Background 
Current ground missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom and in the war on terror 
involve convoy transportation and the security of those convoys. Dangers to convoys 
include Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) that are placed on or near the road being 
used by Unites States military and coalition vehicles. One solution proposed to increase 
security around these mobile units is an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) to monitor the 
route before and during the convoy movement. The UAS could be used to detect 
insurgents placing the IEDs or to detect the IEDs themselves and alert convoy security 
before soldiers, civilians, or property are harmed.  
Many options exist for a route surveillance system concept. A single aircraft with 
on-board sensing and processing could be used, but the effectiveness would be limited 
due to the required revisit rates. A multi-aircraft system could be used to monitor an 
entire stretch of road simultaneously but may require off-board processing and a more 
complicated communication and relay system. Both system types will be exposed to an 
environment where collision potential exists with non-cooperative air traffic or 
cooperative traffic within the UAS. In order to ensure completion of its mission and the 
safe return of the aircraft, separation must be maintained between vehicles in the UAS 
and between the UAS and non-cooperative traffic whether by procedures, human 
interference, or a last line of defense, a collision avoidance system.  
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2. Motivation 
The intuitive need for collision avoidance systems in unmanned aircraft is 
apparent in the abundance of current algorithms, hardware, and complete-system 
developments for UAS of all sizes and complexity. In particular, military applications of 
UAS for defense and intelligence missions, and requirements for those missions, are laid 
out in the Unmanned System Roadmap 2007-2032 [1] and collision avoidance is 
specifically addressed in this roadmap. In fact, Chapter 6, Technologies for Unmanned 
Systems, Section 6.1, Technology Challenges, of the Roadmap states “the single most 
important near-term technical challenge facing unmanned systems is to develop an 
autonomous capability to assess and respond appropriately to near-field objects in their 
path of travel.” This technical challenge is addressed by providing “direction for future 
investments” for collision avoidance systems. 
6.6.8. Dynamic Obstacle/Interference/Collision Avoidance (Including 
Humans) 
All unmanned systems except the smallest special purpose vehicles must have the 
ability to autonomously avoid obstacles. In addition to the simple avoidance of 
obstacles (which is not simple if both the “obstacle” and the vehicle are moving 
independently), we must consider perception elements impacting trafficability, 
tactical maneuver, and mission execution. While most control algorithms are 
sufficiently mature, sensor processing is lacking for autonomous operations. 
Some combination of radar, optical, and infrared (IR) sensors will likely be 
required; and image processing algorithms, especially for the latter two, are in 
their infancy. Most of the mission capabilities also require the autonomous 
avoidance of threat systems, including ships, boats, craft, active sensor systems, 
and, to whatever extent possible, passive detection systems. The community 
would benefit greatly from increased developments in this area. [1] 
 
This Roadmap subsection affirms the need for collision avoidance developments 
in algorithms, sensors, and implementations. While control algorithms may be 
sufficiently mature, the integration of these algorithms with collision detection and 
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tracking algorithms is not mature. Additionally, analysis of commanded maneuvers for 
particular collision encounters is in its infancy. Therefore, additional research in these 
areas is warranted.   
3. Problem Statement 
Unmanned aerial systems are being widely used for intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) missions in both peaceful and wartime missions at home and 
abroad. As the number of separate systems grows and the number of unmanned vehicles 
in a single system increases, the ability to ensure the safety and integrity of the vehicles 
and ensure successful completion of missions is increasingly more difficult. Multiple 
vehicles are currently being used or are being tested for route surveillance, border and 
perimeter patrol, and support missions for all of the Unites States military services and 
other United States government agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security 
and Customs and Border Protection. Collision avoidance systems, whether implemented 
on-board the air platform or through a cooperative network, are a necessary component of 
the overall system. 
Collision avoidance systems will come in many varieties and levels of 
complexity. The type, reliability, and autonomy will depend on operational requirements 
and the system it will protect. Neidhoefer, et al. state “It was concluded that functional 
determinism in autonomous systems is crucial…both to maximize the performance and 
potential benefits of such systems and to ensure that the operational environment…is not 
degraded for any stakeholders with respect to safety, organization, or ease of operation 
[2].” Not only will collision avoidance systems need to demonstrate effectiveness at their 
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defined tasks, they will be subject to intense evaluations, both for systems with and 
without humans in the loop.  
4. Research Objectives/Hypothesis 
The objective of this research was to develop a UAS collision avoidance system 
that deconflicts potential collisions and minimizes the mission impact as several aircraft 
perform a route surveillance mission. Multi-vehicle teams will be used for persistent 
surveillance of routes that will be traveled by convoys, borders between designated 
geographic areas, and perimeters of military and civilian bases and camps. These systems 
will maintain constant coverage of the route and identify possible threats along the route 
or within the area. The persistent surveillance constraint may result in operating the UAS 
in close proximity to each other throughout their coverage pattern. Additionally, 
exogenous inputs such as wind could cause unexpected encounters between UAS in the 
coverage pattern. Research in the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Air Vehicles 
Directorate (AFRL/RB) has successfully shown efficient path planning of UAS that 
provide coverage of a route or perimeter while adding or removing UAS to the pattern 
and while changing the boundaries of the route or perimeter [3]. This research uses 
encounter geometries that may occur in these surveillance patterns as scenarios for 
potential UAS collisions. It is desired that the UAS successfully avoid the collisions and 
return to the prescribed search pattern while minimizing the impact on the sensor’s route 
coverage. Altitude separation may not be a viable separation assurance method depending 
on sensor requirements, optimal operating conditions, and surveillance methods, so this 
research does not assume trivial collision avoidance measures (e.g. altitude separation). 
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As a proof of concept, the developed algorithm was tested on a small-scale micro air 
vehicle (MAV) testbed present within the Advanced Navigation Technology (ANT) 
laboratory. The testbed allows for a scaled version of UAS collision avoidance in a 
representative route surveillance mission. 
The author asserts that a modified three-dimensional collision cone approach 
using aggregated cones and proportional navigation can successfully deconflict 
cooperative UAS in a range of encounter geometries. The algorithm will not rely on 
scripted maneuvers nor be limited to a particular spatial dimension and will provide 
commands to multiple aircraft in a cooperative network. The results will be the first 
known flight tests of a global, three-dimensional, geometric collision avoidance system 
on an unmanned aircraft system. 
5. Research Focus 
Significant amounts of research, development, and discussions in the literature 
involve the current issues of cooperative operations of UAS and airspace integration of 
those systems into airspace systems shared by manned aircraft. The term Sense and 
Avoid (SAA) is typically used to refer to the ability of an aircraft, autonomously for UAS 
and both autonomously and pilot controlled for manned aircraft, to detect a potential 
collision and command a resolution maneuver. This author defines two components to 
SAA: the longer time horizon aspect referred to as Separation Assurance (SA) that is 
dependent on procedures, mission plans, and possibly control station functions, and the 
shorter time horizon aspect Collision Avoidance (CA) that is dependent on aircraft 
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performance and response times as a last line of defense. The relationship between the 
three terms is shown in Figure 1-1. 
 
Figure 1-1:  Sense and Avoid Components 
SA and CA are not always distinguishable depending on the encounter, platform, and 
environmental circumstances; thus, there is overlap between them.  
The algorithms developed in this thesis are intended to fulfill the CA function of a 
SAA system. It is assumed that mission procedures, human operators and the ground 
control station, if applicable, conduct SA actions but fail as a result of errors or 
exogenous inputs into the system and CA actions are required. 
Planar collision encounter scenarios are of primary concern in this research 
because of the route surveillance mission operations. Planar, in this sense, describes 
multiple aircraft operating at constant above ground level (AGL) altitudes, thereby 
introducing collision possibilities while still allowing three-dimensional translational 
motion and collision avoidance reactions. Requiring constant AGL operation negates the 
trivial separation assurance procedure of altitude separation and is justified by any of the 
following reasons: 
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1. Surveillance pattern may require close proximity between platforms, 
2. Sensors may be optimized for specific AGL altitudes so altitude separation would 
adversely affect the sensor measurements, and/or 
3. Change detection requires operation at corresponding altitudes between passes 
because altitude separation would severely increase the false alarm rate. 
6. Methodology 
The steps necessary for successful development and testing of such an algorithm 
are now described. A significant amount of published basic research is used to develop 
the algorithms described in this thesis. Nonetheless, additional theory development is 
completed to extend the published theory for application to this problem. Following 
theory development, application to UAS CA is completed by focusing the research on a 
particular type of system and operation. With this information, tests can be identified to 
exercise the algorithms and performance measures can be enumerated.  
Testing must be performed in a sequential manner with increasing uncertainty and 
complexity added in each step. First, ideal simulations are used to verify algorithm 
theoretical capabilities. For example, collision detection is tested in an ideal simulation 
by constructing an encounter guaranteed to result in a collision. Similarly, collision 
avoidance is tested using the same encounter and is successful if the collision is evaded. 
Assumptions are applied in these simulations such as simplified three degree-of-freedom 
dynamics and perfect command tracking, thereby, alleviating any uncertainty.  
Next, complexity is added by testing the algorithm in a representative 
environment that it will ultimately operate in. Software-in-the-loop (SIL) simulation 
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capability is offered by the manufacturers of the UAS selected for integration. Interfaces 
between the CA algorithm and the system environment are developed in order to 
complete SIL and follow-on tests. The interface is defined in such a way so that it can be 
used on the actual operational system. SIL simulations add necessary uncertainty that 
exists in real-world applications and can be used as a gateway so that if they are not 
successful, progression to the next step is halted until major problems are resolved.   
Further complexity and uncertainty is added with the next test type that is also 
offered by the manufacturer of the selected UAS. Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) tests 
require use of actual external hardware and firmware that will either be onboard the 
aircraft platforms or used on the ground during actual operation. Most firmware and 
integrated software should be identical to that in the SIL tests, but additional 
communication and processing uncertainty now exists when operating on several 
different machines. When HIL and SIL results compare favorably, the algorithms and 
associated interfaces are ready for testing in a fully operating system and are ready for the 
next phase of testing.  
The culmination of the CA system’s development is flight test. A successful 
demonstration in flight test, with real-world uncertainty, complexity, and environmental 
effects, will solidify claims of the algorithm’s effectiveness in its particular application. 
Flight test procedures and objectives must be carefully planned and executed in order to 
demonstrate the CA system’s intended operation and to return results supporting the 
system’s use in future UAS missions. Flight test cases must be constructed properly to 
represent scenarios that will exist in actual operation. Finally, data reduction following 
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the flight test is necessary to communicate the test’s successes, failures, and potential 
follow-on improvements for the CA system.  
7. Assumptions/Scope 
This research develops and exercises a UAS Collision Avoidance Algorithm That 
Minimizes the Impact on Route Surveillance. It should be noted that no optimal control 
or optimal trajectory generation is used in this algorithm. That is not to say, however, that 
portions of the algorithm would not benefit from the use of such theory in the future. The 
CA algorithm is intended to monitor traffic internal and external to a cooperative network 
of UAS platforms. It will detect imminent collisions between any one of the platforms 
and another aircraft and command an appropriate guidance maneuver. The maneuver, 
based on the geometry of the collision and minimum separation definitions, tends to 
command small deviations to maintain minimum separation; thus, minimizing the 
maneuvering and its effect on the mission although not in an optimal sense. Additionally, 
the guidance laws applied here initially command small maneuvers that will grow in 
magnitude as the range decreases between the aircraft. Thus, collision encounters that are 
mitigated early in the encounter timeline will have been resolved with small commands 
minimizing impact on the mission. The algorithm does not provide a recovery course of 
action or commands to return the platforms back to their original trajectories. It does, 
nonetheless, return control of the UAS, after the collision encounter has been abated, 
back to the navigation algorithm embedded in the hardware. The navigation function is 
then used to determine the appropriate route back to the surveillance pattern. The 
algorithm is applicable to many different systems and operations but is limited in this 
 
10 
research to a single available system. This system does not allow onboard processing or 
sensing, and therefore, cannot detect external collisions outside of the cooperative 
network. Throughout the development of the CA algorithm, the potential for external 
threats is considered and the CA algorithm supports inputs from any sensing device 
provided the data is sufficient and in the proper format.  
8. Preview 
Chapter II of this thesis will review applicable theory and applications developed 
in seminal and contemporary literature. Chapter III discusses original theory, algorithm, 
and software developments by this author in addition to hardware and software provided 
by the ANT lab and used in this research. Chapter IV provides analysis and results of all 
testing performed throughout the research. Chapter V discusses the results and 
communicates the author’s conclusions, conjectures, and recommendations for future 
researchers and/or users.  
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II. Literature Review 
1. Chapter Overview 
A significant amount of research and development has been ongoing for years 
involving the higher level topics of SAA and conflict detection and resolution (CD&R) 
and the lower level functions of SA and CA that are encompassed by SAA and CD&R. 
Collision avoidance, as discussed in this thesis, is defined as the detection of an imminent 
collision or violation of some minimum separation distance and a commanded avoidance 
maneuver after SA has failed. Before unmanned aircraft became prevalent, most of this 
research was directed towards commercial aircraft in the United States National Airspace 
System (NAS) and in ground-based robotics. Similar techniques and systems have been 
applied to the UAS collision avoidance problem as well as a variety of newly proposed 
methods. The UAS sub-systems involved in these processes are commonly referred to as 
SAA systems and detect, sense, and avoid systems (DSA). The following sections 
describe common methods applied to UAS CA and examples of implementation or the 
development of each. 
Kuchar and Yang present a broad review and survey of CD&R methods in two 
papers [4] [5]. These papers discuss a wide array of methods applied to the CD&R 
problem to the date of their publications. Section 2 of this chapter reveals current 
developments in recent years to this field and key information for each.  
When characterizing, comparing and contrasting collision avoidance approaches, 
one must describe certain properties of the proposed methods. Kuchar and Yang group all 
algorithms and approaches based on state dimensions, resolution maneuvers, and multiple 
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conflict properties of the algorithms. Dowek and Munoz further define these categories 
[6]. State dimension refers to two or three-dimensional conflict modeling for the 
detection and avoidance of collisions. Two-dimensional modeling typically concentrates 
on a horizontal or vertical plane only. Resolution maneuvers are characterized also by the 
number of dimensions they inhabit. For instance, a maneuver only in the vertical plane 
would be limited to altitude and airspeed changes and would not allow a turn maneuver. 
Multiple conflict properties describe whether a system views CA in the global or pair-
wise sense. Global CA involves all aircraft in the airspace which the algorithm considers 
when monitoring the dynamic airspace, detecting collisions, and commanding 
maneuvers. This is global in the sense that the UAS considers all threats that it is aware 
of simultaneously. This method applies to both cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft. 
Pair-wise avoidance involves one UAS and one intruder regardless of the surrounding 
environment. Encounters between aircraft are resolved one at a time but can include 
considerations for future conflicts or maneuvers. Nonetheless, subsequent avoidance 
maneuvers by one UAS avoiding multiple intruders in a pair-wise fashion are not 
considered global. Pair-wise is also applicable to cooperative and non-cooperative 
aircraft. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Geometric 
Geometric collision detection and avoidance methods involve geometric 
properties of aircraft trajectories and utilize positions and velocity vectors of all or 
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some aircraft involved in the encounter. Geometric methods can be used for collision 
detection by comparing velocity vectors of vehicles and obstacles, and can aide in 
collision resolution/avoidance by providing encounter geometry to the resolution 
guidance algorithm.  
Chakravarthy and Ghose proposed a geometric collision detection and 
avoidance method in a dynamic environment with no constraints on vehicle shape or 
size. Their concept, the collision cone approach, originally developed for robotics, 
has proven to be a valuable foundation for other geometric approaches and methods 
and has been cited many times in the literature [7]. Using state information from the 
vehicle and obstacles, the collision cone approach analytically defines a collision 
region for which a collision is imminent if the vehicle velocity vector lies in this 
region. A thorough outline of the algorithm is given in addition to a number of 
examples by the authors in their publication.  
A collision detection and avoidance approach referred to as the geometric 
optimization approach has been proposed [8]. This geometric collision detection 
method is a typical comparison of velocity vectors, but the resolution is optimized in 
the sense that it attempts to minimize the deviation from the nominal trajectory. The 
author also discusses the geometric optimization approach for multiple intruders but 
limits the effort to sequential avoidance of the most critical encounter. This is still 
considered pair-wise CD&R as opposed to global. Bilimoria noted “that resolutions 
for multiple-aircraft conflicts obtained by sequential pair-wise solutions do not 
necessarily minimize deviations from the nominal trajectories.” Therefore, the 
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minimum deviation from the nominal trajectory may not be a combination of pair-
wise encounter maneuvers, and the solution must be examined in the global sense. 
Goss, Rajvanshi, and Subbarao consider the conflict detection and resolution 
problem using geometric and collision cone approaches for two aircraft in a three 
dimensional environment [9]. The pair-wise avoidance solution is found using the 
collision cone approach to detect a collision and generates a combination of velocity, 
heading, and elevation changes to avoid the collision. Analytical solutions are 
rigorously found for special encounter situations, but a numerical solver is used for 
more general cases. Numerical solutions are not ideal for real-time applications, and 
according to the authors, “the nonlinear equation solver has a tendency to get stuck at 
spurious updates in more complex scenarios.” This pair-wise solution method would 
only increase in difficulty for simultaneous multiple intruders. 
A pair-wise non-cooperative decision making algorithm for three-dimensional 
collision avoidance was presented by Carbone, et al. The authors contend their 
collision avoidance method is suitable for real-time applications because of analytical 
solutions that do not require numerical programming [10]. Similarly to Goss, 
Rajvanshi, and Subbarao, Carbone’s three-dimensional geometric method is based on 
the collision cone. Numerical simulations are offered to demonstrate the algorithm’s 
ability to maintain minimum separation while including sensor field-of-view 
limitations. The resolution algorithm, nevertheless, does not utilize all three of its 
control variables (i.e. longitudinal, lateral-directional, and speed) at the same time. 
However, comparisons of the three are presented. 
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2.2. Force Field 
Force field methods are global approaches to CD&R. Vehicles can 
individually be represented as charged particles and repulse each other given position 
and velocity information of each or the entire airspace can be defined as a potential 
field or magnetic field and vehicles are maneuvered based on the global environment. 
This method is suited for distributed collision avoidance where state information is 
readily available from all vehicles, but can be applied to local avoidance when the 
number of vehicles is small.  
Despite the distributed and global aspects of force field methods, several 
elements of these approaches are difficult to incorporate into practical systems. When 
generating a dynamic potential field, saddle points and local minima can disrupt the 
flow of vehicles and introduce additional problems such as aircraft stall or further 
collision threats. As eluded to previously, aircraft performance and dynamic 
characteristics must be taken into account when generating a field or evasive 
commands. If complete state information is not known for all vehicles or if a 
magnetic/potential field is not properly formed, aggressive control commands may be 
generated that are outside of the vehicles’ abilities. 
Sigurd and How investigate a “total-field sensing approach of magnetic 
nature” focused on systems with a large number of N vehicles [11]. The authors assert 
that local control approaches break down as N grows and the complexity and 
potential for collision grow exponentially. Also, many previous potential field 
approaches required perfect information or perfect sensing for safe maneuvering 
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through the obstacle field. Complexity and imperfect information, or lack of 
information, say Sigurd and How, necessitate a distributed control approach. The 
authors provided simulation results and a hardware experiment as advocates for their 
algorithm. Although their discussions of increasing collision potential as N grows and 
the benefits of distributed control are thorough, the authors’ approach has many 
drawbacks to aircraft collision avoidance. All vehicles would be required to carry a 
magnetic field generating device and a magnetic field sensing system, limiting this 
approach to cooperative collision avoidance.   
A multiple-vehicle UAS deconfliction algorithm based on potential functions, 
referred to by the authors as navigation functions, was developed and presented by 
Rahmani, et al. [12]. The approach addresses conflict prediction, resolution, 
navigation and control of flying vehicles while obeying mission requirements. 
Simulations are described that support their approach. This paper expands traditional 
potential methods by using maneuvering obstacles, ensuring vehicles are in constant 
motion and embedding mission requirements in the construction of the navigation 
function. Aircraft operational limitations are included in the formulation of guidance 
and control commands. Stagnation problems, a typical drawback of potential 
functions for flying vehicle applications, are dealt with in this paper with the addition 
of a swirling effect in the potential function. This, however, detracts from the 
compliance with vehicle operational limitations formulated in the original function. 
Consequently, vehicle motion constraints and maneuver constraints cannot be 
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guaranteed simultaneously. Saddle points are also a complication in the potential 
function and would cause a catastrophic effect in real applications.     
2.3. Probabilistic 
Probabilistic methods for aircraft CD&R may involve the calculation of the 
probability of collision based on current aircraft states and possible perturbations 
about that nominal state or the probability of collision based on all possible 
maneuvers and their likelihood of occurring. These methods avoid the 
conservativeness of worst-case prediction methods while maintaining robustness to 
uncertainty [13]. Statistical representations of the airspace environment, for global 
applications, and of its inhabitants, for pair-wise applications, must be characterized 
prior to algorithm design. Detailed knowledge of the airspace and its inhabitants is 
required and is used, typically, in Monte Carlo simulation for characterization.  
Prandini, et al., 1999 and 2000, present approaches for probabilistic conflict 
detection for mid-range and short-range conflict scenarios [13] [14]. The authors 
define mid-range conflicts in the time horizon as tens of minutes and short-range 
conflicts as seconds to minutes. The probability of conflict is characterized by Monte-
Carlo simulations and, in some special cases, closed form solutions are presented. 
These papers are focused primarily on the Air Traffic Management System (ATMS) 
and aircraft following flight plans and their respective waypoints. The CD&R 
functions are computationally intensive and require closed-form approximations and 
estimating algorithms for real-time applications.  
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Probability based methods have been applied to non-aircraft conflict 
detections [15]. Although the application is quite different, derivations of time to 
closest approach (TCA) and minimum miss distance (MMD) for spacecraft could be 
applied to aircraft as long as linear assumptions are valid. Simulation and 
experimental results were used to validate the probability of collision calculations.  
Probabilistic methods specifically for UAS collision avoidance are discussed 
in three dimensions assuming UAS constant velocity [16]. The collision is 
decomposed into a horizontal plane and a vertical plane, and minimum separation 
criteria are defined for each plane. Probabilistic trajectory modeling is accomplished 
by modeling uncertainty in own-ship and intruder position and velocity obtained from 
a data-link system and in intruder maneuvering uncertainty. Threat levels are defined 
for probability of collision values determined from Monte-Carlo simulations. Scripted 
maneuvers are defined for each threat level in three dimensions although in 
simulation only vertical maneuvers are performed. The authors attribute this to the 
minimum separation definitions which make vertical maneuvers less aggressive.  
2.4. Other Methods 
Collision avoidance is a primary topic in swarming/flocking research of birds, 
insects, and other animals with applications to multiple aircraft operations in close 
proximity. Park, Tahk, and Bang discuss the historical evolution of swarming/ 
flocking research in computer graphics, gaming, and most importantly, aerospace 
applications [17]. The authors reference Reynolds’ research of flocking behaviors and 
steering behaviors and his creation of “boids” (bird-oid) in flocking simulations [18] 
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[19]. Flocking can be modeled using three distinct and simultaneous behaviors, one of 
which is collision avoidance. Also, sub-behaviors were defined that make up the three 
main behaviors. Those sub-behaviors that relate to collision avoidance include 
fleeing, evading, and obstacle avoidance. Many of these basic functions are 
implemented using geometric techniques of summing or aligning velocity vectors.  
Park, Tahk, and Bang implement CA in a pair-wise sense by defining a 
“safety-bubble” around the boid (aircraft) and commanding a scaled steering 
command opposite of the line of sight direction to the closest boid violating the 
bubble. This method is tested in three degree-of-freedom simulations.  
A recent development in CA does not involve a detection or control method, 
but involves a spatial representation with which to define the avoidance approach. 
The Curvature-Velocity-Orientation (CVO) Method transfers aircraft motion from 
Cartesian space into CVO space and applies a potential field CA method for obstacle 
avoidance [20]. The potential field method transformed into CVO space is designed 
to take into account aircraft dynamic constraints making its application to UAS CA 
more achievable. Successful simulation results are shown but only for stationary 
obstacles. Also, the CVO results, as compared to the Cartesian space counterpart, 
contain undesirable oscillations in its final trajectory. 
3. Flight Tests and Notable Simulations 
Notable simulations of CA system responses to collision encounters include tests 
by Farley and Erzberger, and Paielli [21] [22]. Farley and Erzberger used recorded 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic data in the Cleveland Air Route Traffic 
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Control Center airspace to test their conflict resolution algorithm in nominal and heavy 
traffic conditions. Paielli used archived data of actual loss of separation due to controller 
error tracking data to test his method of solving imminent air traffic conflicts. The 
archived data consists of 100 operational error occurrences caused by the controller, 
which, according to Paielli, tend to be more difficult to detect and resolve than routine 
conflicts that get resolved successfully. 
Another interesting simulation implementation of a CA system was focused on 
vision-based obstacle avoidance for UAS. The respective avoidance algorithm is based in 
Minimum Effort Guidance and was compared to proportional navigation guidance in a 
sequence of publications [23]. This guidance method was then tested using a six degree-
of-freedom image-in-the-loop simulation set-up to exercise the vision-based detection 
algorithms and the subsequent avoidance maneuver [24]. Results of image processing, 
estimation, and guidance are analyzed. Image processing post-analysis shows the image 
processing algorithm did detect the obstacles but not as expected. The guidance system 
performed as expected and maintained required separation from the obstacles, but a 
significant limitation of these results is that the obstacles were stationary. 
Significant amounts of hardware and software-in-the-loop simulations and 
calibrations, including communication system latencies, have been performed to prepare 
an obstacle detection, tracking, and CA system for flight test [25]. Ground tests 
characterizing system behavior and latencies are being performed for algorithms and 
sensors, both electro-optical (EO) and radar, and statistical performance properties of 
these have been defined.  
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A successful flight test of a maneuvering aircraft around another stationary, 
hovering aircraft was described by Neifhoefer, et al. [2]. The authors’ intent was to 
demonstrate that practical implementations of highly autonomous functionally 
deterministic systems are possible. “Highly autonomous” in the previous sentence is a 
broad statement that could include traditional fly-by-wire autopilots or systems with 
high-level autonomy that involve complex decision-making or interaction with humans. 
The UAS in this experiment was commanded to fly a straight line path to a point along 
which it would collide with another aircraft. The collision avoidance system detected a 
collision and generated a safe, modified trajectory around the other aircraft to the goal 
point. Additionally, the modified path could be controlled and the resulting direction of 
the avoidance maneuvers was thereby changed. Results of the flight test are shown and 
conclusions are made about the feasibility of functionally deterministic systems being 
used on UAS. 
Large scale flight tests have been completed by Northrop Grumman Corp. and 
AFRL using the variable-stability Calspan Learjet as a UAS surrogate aircraft [26]. These 
flight tests investigated the feasibility and effectiveness of the Traffic Alert and Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS), a human-in-the-loop collision warning system used on 
today’s commercial aircraft, in an autonomous collision avoidance role. The benefits of 
using TCAS in future UAS sense and avoid systems were shown through analyses of the 
flight test results. The tests consisted of a variety of encounter scenarios between the 
surrogate UAS and intruder aircraft: 1) level head-on, 2) abeam, 3) ascending head-on, 
and 4) descending head-on.  
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4. Summary 
Chapter II provided a comprehensive, but not all-inclusive, overview of methods 
and techniques that have and are being applied to collision detection and avoidance. The 
most common methods were discussed by providing examples of their uses, from 
theoretical derivations to modern applications. The topic of UAS CA has been 
exhaustively researched, but no solution yet exists that can provide a generic capability 
for effective and safe CA for all aerospace applications. It is not this author’s intent to 
undertake this daunting task; this thesis is meant to provide a capability for the UAS 
mission described in Chapter I and that is applicable to other UAS civil and military 
operations.  
Geometric methods provide the most straightforward and extensible collision 
detection and avoidance techniques. A large amount of research has been completed on 
these approaches as they apply to UAS CA. However, no single existing solution 
addresses three-dimensional CA in the global sense for cooperative UAS operations. 
Cooperative, as defined in this research, is the exchange of information between UAS, 
either directly between platforms or through some single control station. Force field 
methods are well suited for global collision avoidance, but drawbacks such as including 
UAS performance limits and expansion to three-dimensional applications hinders their 
use. Probabilistic methods accommodate uncertain air traffic environments that can be 
described by statistical properties. This, however, requires modeling the probability of 
future trajectories for all entities in the environment, both cooperative and non-
cooperative. Geometric methods address cooperative and non-cooperative traffic in the 
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same manner by comparing nominal trajectories using state information from either a 
cooperative network or sensors. This research focuses on the cooperative network of 
UAS, but the resulting algorithm is compatible with other sensed traffic. A geometric 
method, based on the collision cone approach [7], is used as the foundation for a three-
dimensional global collision avoidance algorithm for UAS collision avoidance. 
The collision cone approach has concurrently been expanded to three dimensions 
and applied in the global sense by this thesis’ author but only for a single UAS [27]. 
Considerable amounts of additional research and development is needed for a novel and 
robust algorithm that manages both cooperative and non-cooperative traffic and detects 
imminent collisions and issues avoidance commands to a group of UAS. That type of 
algorithm does not yet exist in a single solution and certainly has not been flight tested 
according to an extensive literature review. This research engages both the algorithm and 
implementation deficiencies, and flight tests the resultant solutions.
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III. Methodology 
1. Chapter Overview 
As discussed in Chapter II, the collision detection and avoidance method being 
employed in this research is based on the collision cone approach. According to the 
geometry of the encounter and the rates of change of translation and orientation, safe 
regions of flight are defined by the algorithm for each UAS in the cooperative network. 
In order to complete the algorithm, each UAS must be directed to safety in a manner 
consistent with the geometry of the encounter. Consequently, an algorithm providing 
guidance commands that are integrated with the detection algorithm is developed and 
refined for UAS CA.  
A generic architecture, represented in pseudo-code, is shown in Figure 3-1 and 
describes in detail the process flow of a CA algorithm integrated with the navigation 
system of a UAS. The acronym GCS stands for ground control station which is the 
controlling unit that commands all UAS in the cooperative group. This research will not 
address all possible CA functions shown in the figure (see Chapter I, Section 7). Non-
cooperative traffic will not be considered so Function 2 under “IF COMM LINK -> 
GUID_MODE” is not performed. Similarly, “ELSEIF NO COMM_LINK” is not 
considered, because information must be transmitted between aircraft for cooperative 
CA. Lastly, RECOVER_MODE is assumed to be the navigation mode of the UAS and is 
not considered in this CA system. 
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Figure 3-1:  CA Algorithm Pseudo-Code 
IF COMM_LINK 
 
 GUID_MODE 
1) Monitor Cooperative Airspace (GCS) 
- Collision detection algorithm 
 
IF NO_CONFLICT 
1) Fly Surveillance Pattern 
 
ELSEIF CONFLICT 
 CA_MODE 
1) Do Not Maneuver 
- Not immediate threat 
- Continue monitoring cooperative airspace 
2) Maneuver 
- Function of range, threat maneuvering, priority 
to maneuver, own status (are you the threat) 
- Rules of the road 
RECOVER_MODE 
 IF NO_NEW_CONFLICT 
1) Recover 
ELSEIF NEW_CONFLICT 
 CA_MODE  
 
2) Monitor Non-cooperative Airspace (On-board sensing) 
- Requires on-board detection algorithm for non-cooperative traffic 
in addition to GCS detection algorithm for out-of-view cooperative 
traffic 
 
IF NO_CONFLICT 
 Same as above 
ELSEIF CONFLICT 
 Same as above 
 
ELSEIF NO COMM_LINK 
 
 GUID_MODE 
1) GCS Only 
 
i) Prescribed altitude separation 
ii) Loiter at current position 
iii) Loiter at prescribed location 
iv) RTB 
 
2) On-board sensing 
 Modes: 
GUID_MODE – route surveillance guidance mode, collision detection algorithm 
monitors UAS airspace 
CA_MODE – collision avoidance system mode, assumes control from guidance mode, 
flagged by detection algorithm 
RECOVER_MODE – recovery mode from collision avoidance to route surveillance, only 
initiated after CA_MODE 
 
Status: 
COMM_LINK – health of communication link (binary or threshold) 
NO_CONFLICT – detection algorithm status 
CONFLICT – detection algorithm status, initiates CA_MODE 
NO_NEW_CONFLICT – recovery mode status, initiates recovery maneuver 
NEW_CONFLICT – recovery mode status, initiates CA_MODE 
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2. Theory and Algorithms 
The collision cone approach uses position, velocity, orientation, and orientation 
rate to determine if the nominal, or dead-reckoned, trajectories of two or more vehicles 
will result in a violation of some minimum miss distance [7]. This approach applies to 
any irregularly shaped object and depends only on current flight path information. 
Chakravarthy and Ghose derived the planar algorithm that defined the angular bounds of 
the collision cone. Smith, et al., derived the angular rates of change of the cone bounds 
and described their use in a three-dimensional CA control scheme based on Proportional 
Navigation (PN) guidance [27]. These two algorithms combined form the foundation of a 
robust and expandable CA algorithm that is compatible with real-time applications.  
A collision cone is the region within which the velocity vector of a vehicle will 
violate an obstacle separation zone or collide with that object. The cone is a function of 
current states only but is numerically straightforward and not computationally intensive. 
A comprehensive description of the algorithm is given in Reference [7]. The 
nomenclature is repeated here for convenience. Figure 3-2 shows two-dimensional 
collision cones for three generic encounter cases. A single intruder can have as many as 
two collision cones if it is a collision threat, and for N intruders, there can be as many as 
2N cones. In Figure 3-2, a blue arrow represents an aircraft velocity vector, a black circle 
defines the minimum separation area around a collision threat, a blue line represents the 
line of sight, red lines are the collision cone bounds, and green arrows point to the interior 
of the collision cone. 
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           (a)             (b)            (c)  
Figure 3-2:  Two Dimensional Collision Cone Configurations (a) Single Cone (b) 
Split Cone (c) Multiple Intruders, Single and Split Cones [27] 
Alpha, α, is the UAS velocity vector direction defined as positive counter-
clockwise (CCW) from the x-axis. Beta, β, is a potential threat’s velocity vector direction 
also defined positive CCW from the x-axis. Gamma, γ, is the UAS vertical flight path 
angle defined positive up. Chi, χ, is the potential threat’s vertical flight path angle. Theta, 
θ, is the horizontal plane line-of-sight (LOS) angle from a UAS to a particular threat 
defined as positive CCW. Phi, φ, is the vertical plane LOS angle defined along the UAS 
velocity vector and positive up from the horizontal plane. Range, r, can be used to 
represent the horizontal distance between two aircraft or the slant-range distance. The 
horizontal minimum separation radius is given by R and defines the lateral separation. 
The vertical minimum separation is referred to as the vertical offset (VO). The collision 
cone boundaries are given as a lower and upper angular bound, α1 and α2, respectively. 
Similarly, their rates of change are  and , where (•) represents time rate of change. 
Smith, et al., derived the rates of change of the cone bounds, and these equations are 
repeated in Appendix B with some additional simplifications. Each collision cone has its 
own set of boundaries and rates, and each plane has its own set of cones. The bounds and 
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their rates of change are defined entirely by the encounter geometry, including range, 
speed, heading, and the minimum separation distance. The bounds and bound rates 
returned by the extended collision cone algorithm are normalized by the LOS angles and 
their rates and are given by , respectively. The absolute bounds are 
given by Eq. (1), and their rates by Eq. (2). The vertical plane representation is given by 
simply replacing θ with φ and applying the appropriate upper and lower bounds.  
                                                            (1) 
                                                            (2) 
The collision cone approach is valid for irregularly shaped objects. These oddly 
shaped objects are decomposed into circular regions that can be used to define a 
minimum separation zone around the object. This also allows different definitions of 
minimum separation in the lateral and vertical directions. Many of the geometric-based 
CA algorithms discussed in Chapter II assume a spherical safety zone around obstacles 
and other aircraft. This assumption simplifies the derivation of some detection and 
avoidance algorithms but does not allow the flexibility of independent separation 
distances in the horizontal and vertical planes. The minimum separation volume in this 
research uses definitions from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) of aircraft 
encounters. The FAA classifies the encounter’s criticality by the horizontal separation 
and vertical separation of the aircraft involved. Likewise, a lateral and vertical separation 
forming a cylinder in three dimensions is used for this research. When viewed in the 
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horizontal plane, the cylinder appears as a circle and the collision cone algorithm can be 
applied directly. When viewed in the vertical plane, the cylinder appears as a rectangle 
that must be decomposed into a circle for application of the algorithm. Lines extending 
from a particular UAS location tangent to the rectangle’s protruding corners in the 
vertical plane can be found, and a circle residing in these lines whose boundary is also 
tangent to them can be defined. The radius of this circle changes as the range from the 
UAS to the center of the circle changes. By selecting the range to the center of the circle 
to equal the range from the UAS to the threat, the radius of the circle can be found. 
Reference [7] gives this relationship and it is repeated in Eq. (3). 
                                                     (3)      
With the definition of a radius for the minimum separation in the vertical plane, the 
collision cone approach can now be directly applied. The vertical plane geometry as 
viewed by the algorithm is shown in Figure 3-3. 
 
          (a)                     (b) 
Figure 3-3:  Collision Cone Approach in the Vertical Plane (a) Single Cone (b) 
Multiple Intruders, Single and Split Cone [27] 
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The line and arrow features in Figure 3-3 are the same as described for Figure 3-2, 
except the black circle is replaced by a black rectangle for the minimum separation area. 
Grey dashed lines project from the UAS velocity vector and are tangent to the rectangles 
protruding corners. The resultant separation circle calculated using Eq. (3) resides inside 
these lines and is also grey and dashed. 
Given collision cone angular bounds and their rates of change defined in two 
planes, the horizontal and vertical, as a function of different separation criteria for 
minimum lateral separation and vertical offset, a sufficient description of the encounter 
geometry exists for CA. It is a simple extension from a single three-dimensional cone for 
a single obstacle to multiple cones for several obstacles. The modified collision cone 
algorithm is simply executed for each obstacle. However, this gives only a disassociated 
view of the threat environment and represents sequential pair-wise collision detection. A 
conservative, yet effective, approach to providing global collision detection is to 
aggregate overlapping individual collision cones in their respective planes into a single, 
all-encompassing cone that describes every potential obstacle threat in that region. 
Multiple collision cones are still possible if there is no overlap. The aggregate cone 
method guarantees the velocity vector will only exist in a single cone, and any necessary 
avoidance maneuvers are with respect to that single cone. Thus, the assignment of 
commands is not confounded by prioritization of individual threats or selection schemes 
of a set of maneuvers and no conflicting commands are issued. Figure 3-4 gives a visual 
representation of aggregating cone bounds. 
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Figure 3-4:  Aggregate Cone Bounds 
Figure 3-5 gives a complete description of key attributes of a two-ship encounter as 
viewed by the aggregate multiple vehicle UAS collision cone algorithm. 
 
Figure 3-5:  Full Encounter Description 
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Using collision cone information about the angular bounds and their rates of 
change, guidance commands can be generated in concert with the geometry of the 
collision. Han and Bang, and subsequently Han, proposed a proportional navigation 
based CA scheme for UAS CA [28] [29]. They found the relative velocity vector of the 
UAS could be guided to a “collision avoidance vector” with proportional navigation and 
thereby alleviating the collision. Han also went as far as deriving the optimal proportional 
gain assuming constant velocity and investigated convergence of the guidance law as a 
function of the navigation constant. In this application to cooperative UAS CA, a similar 
approach is used for the CA guidance commands. The UAS velocity vector is chosen 
instead of the relative velocity vector because the collision cone approach is used instead 
of the geometric configuration approach discussed by Han. Han uses a geometric 
comparison of the relative velocity vector and the tangents to a minimum separation zone 
around an obstacle to define the guidance parameters. By using the collision cone 
approach, a collision detection method is not limited to a single vector comparison but is 
able to define an entire region of unsafe operation. The UAS velocity vector can then be 
guided outside of this unsafe region instead of just a single obstacle cone. Once the 
velocity vector is coincident to the edge of the aggregate collision cone, the UAS is 
guaranteed to maintain minimum separation by flying a trajectory that results in tangency 
to the minimum separation volume. At this point, guidance commands may cease and the 
cone and velocity vector are monitored for future violations. The proportional navigation 
guidance law used in this UAS CA algorithm is shown in Eq. (4). 
                                                       (4) 
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In Eq. (4), a is the commanded acceleration, N is the navigation constant, VUAS is the 
UAS velocity, and  is the cone bound rate used for guidance (read on for a description 
of its selection). This guidance law is a variation of generalized true proportional 
navigation [30] where the commanded acceleration a, or, synonymously, angular rate, is 
perpendicular to the line of sight offset by a fixed angle. This offset angle is the 
normalized cone bound angle calculated using the collision cone approach that is then 
added to the line of sight to form the absolute cone bound. The proportional gain, which 
Han proved must be greater than one for convergence, is chosen depending on aircraft 
maneuverability and the geometry of typical encounters. 
Which cone bound angular rate is used in the guidance law is chosen based on the 
magnitude and direction of the bound movement. For instance, a contracting cone could 
either have both cone bounds converging towards the center of the cone, or one cone 
bound converging to the center faster than the other bound that is diverging. Similarly, an 
expanding cone either has both cones diverging or one bound diverging faster than the 
other converging bound. The angular rate used in the guidance law depends on whether 
the cone is diverging or converging, whether the bounds are moving in the same or 
opposite directions, and the magnitude of each bound angular rate. The preceding 
discussion applies to both the horizontal plane and the vertical plane. The following 
tables, Table 3-1 and Table 3-2, define the logic for the guidance law angular rate choice 
and the corresponding angle choice. Blue shading denotes a diverging cone and green 
shading denotes a converging cone. Subscript 1 implies the upper cone bound and 
subscript 2 implies the lower cone bound. 
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Table 3-1:  Guidance Law Angular Rate Matrix, Horizontal Plane 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3-2:  Guidance Law Angular Rate Matrix, Vertical Plane 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The logic is based on intuition and trial and error. For example, if both cone 
bound rates are positive, it would require minimal effort to deconflict by maneuvering in 
the opposite direction, allowing the cone to move away from the velocity vector in 
addition to the vehicle moving its velocity vector out of the cone. This is visually 
depicted in Figure 3-6.  
 
Figure 3-6:  Guidance Logic Example 
Cone Rates 
Resultant  
Turn Rate 
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Assuming Figure 3-6 is in the horizontal plane, it corresponds to the first column 
in Table 3-1. More information (i.e. magnitude of the bound angular rates) is needed to 
determine the corresponding row. 
When overlapping cones are combined into an aggregate cone, the new cone 
bounds are used in the guidance logic when choosing which angular rate to use in the 
guidance law. The bound corresponding to the angular rate choice used in the guidance 
law is maintained throughout the encounter as the guidance bound selection in order to 
prevent oscillating commands resulting from bound switching. Bound switching could 
occur if two separate cones overlap in the middle of the encounter or if an individual cone 
inside of the aggregate cone envelops another individual cone. 
The guidance commands generated independently from the horizontal and vertical 
planes are decomposed into components along and perpendicular to the UAS velocity 
vector. Once decomposed, they can be combined into a single set of commands in three 
dimensions. These commands are turn rate ( ), translational acceleration ( ), and rate 
of change of the vertical velocity vector ( ). The formulation of the guidance commands 
is shown in Eqs. (5-7). 
                                              (5)  
                        (6) 
                      (7) 
Subscript c denotes a command, h denotes horizontal plane, and v denotes vertical plane. 
Subscripts 1 and 2 represent the upper or lower cone bound, respectively. VUAS is the 
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aircraft velocity. It should be noted that because of the definition of α, the turn rate 
command shown here is opposite in sign as typical turn rate definitions where heading is 
defined as positive clockwise (CW) from the y-axis (North).  
Alternative commands can be derived from these basic commands depending on 
the application and autopilot. A set of such commands are shown below in Eqs. (8-10).  
                                                           (8) 
                                                          (9) 
                                                        (10) 
Integration operators in the equations above are calculated using Euler integration. The 
symbol ψ represents UAS heading and is defined positive CW from the y-axis. Theta, θ, 
in this context, represents the UAS pitch angle. This command is generated under the 
assumption of small angle of attack and a small delay between changes in pitch and 
changes in flight path angle.  
Smith, et al., described an own-ship UAS CA algorithm based on the collision 
cone approach [27]. This algorithm detected potential collisions with multiple intruders 
and commanded avoidance maneuvers to the UAS. It was assumed the intruder states 
were known, either from a communication network, or from on-board sensors. This 
algorithm is used as the foundation for a cooperative multiple vehicle UAS CA system. 
Because of the variety of UAS architectures, the cooperative UAS algorithm must be 
compatible with many systems. For instance, a UAS could consist of multiple 
decentralized platforms each with a CA system on-board, but with the systems acting in a 
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synergetic manner. Or, a system could consist of multiple platforms controlled by a 
centralized ground control station which commands the UAS and carries the burden of all 
CA processing. Therefore, the own-ship CA algorithm was modified to incorporate 
cooperative platform inputs internal to the UAS and non-cooperative threat inputs 
external to the UAS and provided by some sensor suite independently. It does not matter 
inside the modified collision cone algorithm whether the inputs are from cooperative or 
non-cooperative entities, but on real systems the means by which to acquire the inputs 
differs greatly (e.g. from the GCS or from the onboard sensors).  
The modified and aggregate collision cone algorithm is extended to cooperative 
multi-vehicle UAS CA by executing the modified collision cone algorithm independently 
for each UAS. In each iteration, a different UAS is treated as the own-ship and the other 
UAS and any other sensed threat is treated as a moving obstacle. Consistent collision 
detections between conflicting UAS are inherent because the encounter geometry is a 
mirror image of the other. Commands generated by the proportional navigation guidance 
can be treated in a coordinated or uncoordinated manner. Coordinated is defined in this 
research as a synchronization of commands between multiple cooperative UAS reacting 
to the same collision encounter. Cooperative and coordinated CA is potentially extremely 
efficient because small maneuvers by two UAS with conflicting flight paths could be 
more energy efficient than one of the UAS performing an extreme maneuver. However, 
the coordination of commands becomes exponentially more difficult as the number of 
UAS increases. The following table, Table 3-3, shows what combinations of cooperative 
and coordinated CA are used in this application. 
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Table 3-3:  Cooperation/Coordination Matrix 
Information 
Avoidance Commands 
Uncoordinated Coordinated 
Non-Cooperative Horizontal, Vertical  
Cooperative Horizontal Vertical 
 
Uncoordinated maneuvers are the only option with non-cooperative traffic, and 
are required by UAS with onboard sensing and processing of external threats. A 
cooperative group of UAS can be guided by uncoordinated or coordinated commands. 
The proportional navigation guidance coupled with the collision cone approach addresses 
the direction and magnitude of commands; however, conflicting commands are possible 
for certain encounter geometries. For level, co-altitude flight encounters, flight path 
commands tend to be the same sign. However, logically, one would want the aircraft to 
move in opposite directions even if the horizontal commands maintain lateral separation. 
Thus, the vertical commands can be coordinated in an encounter to direct one aircraft to 
climb and the other to descend while allowing the horizontal avoidance to operate 
uncoordinated. Only when the difference in angular heading of approaching aircraft is 
approaching zero, nearly parallel converging trajectories, do the horizontal guidance 
commands have difficulty deconflicting the aircraft. In these extreme cases, the 
coordinated vertical guidance provides the primary separation commands. When three or 
four aircraft are in a collision encounter, a pair or pairs of aircraft will tend to maneuver 
in the same vertical direction. These pairs will rely on horizontal guidance commands to 
achieve separation. Any more than four aircraft will require more sophisticated command 
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coordination than what is discussed here, such as optimization techniques to reduce 
conflicting maneuvers.  
3. Hardware 
The UAS chosen for the CA algorithm integration is the AFIT ANT laboratory’s 
Battlefield Air Targeting Camera Autonomous Micro-air vehicle (BATCAM). BATCAM 
is a miniature unmanned aircraft manufactured by Applied Research Associates, Inc., and 
is used by the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) for surveillance and 
reconnaissance missions.  
 
Figure 3-7:  BATCAM 
BATCAM, shown in Figure 3-7, is categorized by the 2007-2032 UAS roadmap 
as a “Tactical 1 Special Operations Forces Team Small Unit Company and below” 
system that is a small, hand-launched, platform with electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) 
sensors or communication equipment as the primary payload [1]. BATCAM is also 
classified by the roadmap as a Level 0 domestic-use UAS which is described as a system 
under two pounds within line of sight control that operates in unregulated airspace. The 
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utility of the BATCAM system is outlined in a presentation by then Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force for Science, Technology, and Engineering James Engle to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities 
[31]. Mr. Engle says of the BATCAM in its role in the Battlefield Air Operations (BAO) 
kit, “BATCAM replaces the current UAV system in the BAO kit with one that is five 
times smaller and ten times lighter, yet still provides covert reconnaissance, is simple to 
operate, inexpensive enough to be expendable, and can provide real-time battle damage 
assessment.” Table 3-4 lists the key characteristics of the BATCAM platform. 
Table 3-4:  BATCAM Platform/System Characteristics [32] 
 BATCAM 
Manufacturer ARA 
User Service SOCOM 
Weight 0.84 lb 
Length 24 in 
Wingspan 21 in 
Payload Capacity 0.09 lb 
Engine Type Battery 
Ceiling 11,000 ft [33] 
Radius 1.6 nm 
Endurance 18 min 
Number Planned 23 systems 
Number 
UA/System 
2 
   
The EO/IR sensor system on the BATCAM consists of two cameras: one mounted 
forward-looking and the other mounted side-looking. The two camera angles provide a 
powerful surveillance/reconnaissance capability allowing forward views in straight-level 
flight and side views for single-point monitoring and loitering. For a route surveillance 
mission, long stretches of road can be viewed by a human operator or autonomous target 
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recognition (ATR) user, and single points of interest can be monitored for the endurance 
of the platform. 
An important component of the BATCAM system is the autopilot onboard which 
is responsible for autonomously operating the aircraft, receiving and responding to 
commands from the human controller, and relaying information back to the controller. 
The autopilot used in the ANT laboratory’s BATCAM systems is the Kestrel Autopilot 
System from Procerus Technologies [34]. The Kestrel autopilot is designed for miniature 
and micro aerial vehicles.  
 
Figure 3-8:  Kestrel Autopilot [34] 
The Kestrel Autopilot (see Figure 3-8) provides autonomous flight, takeoff, and 
landing capability via tunable control laws and Global Positioning System (GPS) 
navigation. The system is complete with wireless communication equipment for 
uploading/downloading of information to/from an integrated GCS which will be 
described in detail shortly. The autopilot includes a full sensor suite containing three-axis 
 
42 
accelerometers and gyros for acceleration, attitude and rate information, and a pitot-static 
system for pressure measurements and calculations. A communication box ground 
component is the interface between the GCS (installed on a laptop) and the Kestrel 
autopilot. The Kestrel Autopilot also allows manual control via a radio control (R/C) 
device. Combined with the live and recordable telemetry capabilities of the autopilot, and 
an experienced R/C pilot, this system is well-suited for developmental and operational 
flight tests from safety and technical standpoints.  
 
Figure 3-9:  Virtual Cockpit 
The GCS component of the Kestrel Autopilot system is the Virtual Cockpit 
Windows-based software system installed on a compatible laptop. Virtual Cockpit, 
shown in Figure 3-9, enables multiple vehicle UAS monitoring and control, and most 
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importantly, an external interface for user-developed algorithms. The GCS displays 
spatial information of all UAS in a flight plan and map display window, as well as 
attitude information in a heads-up-display (HUD) virtual window. Communication 
information is displayed for each UAS, and real-time status alerts are provided to the user 
with voice announcements. Virtual Cockpit provides in-flight autopilot tuning 
capabilities via graphical variable interfaces, and in-flight mode switching between 
navigation, manual, altitude, etc., modes.  
Table 3-5:  Collision Avoidance Algorithm Function Descriptions 
Function Name Description 
mult_uas_aa Performs parsing of cooperative and non-cooperative UAS 
inputs. Performs calculations and organizational tasks for 
collision cone avoidance algorithm inputs. Calls collision 
avoidance algorithm. Processes avoidance algorithm outputs and 
retains persistent variables for next algorithm call. Completes 
coordination of commands, as necessary. Calculates Kestrel 
Autopilot commands from avoidance algorithm commands.  
cc_pn_aa Performs calculations for collision cone approach algorithm. 
Uncouples horizontal and vertical collision cone planes. Calls 
collision cone algorithm for each threat object/obstacle for 
horizontal and vertical planes. Processes normalized collision 
cone approach outputs to absolute representation. Aggregates 
collision cones based on existing overlap. Determines cone 
violation via velocity vector comparison. If conflict exists, 
determines cone angle and rate to use in guidance. Applies 
proportional navigation guidance to both planes to generate 
avoidance commands. Retains flags for use in next function call. 
f_collisioncone4 Collision cone approach implementation function. Calculates 
collision cone bound angles and angular rates between own-ship 
and intruder. 
wrap_mpi2pi Wraps angles from minus pi to pi 
wrap_pos Wraps angles to positive values 
wrap_neg Wraps angles to negative values 
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4. Implementation 
CA algorithm development is completed in the MATLAB environment because 
of the author’s familiarity with the application, the ANT laboratory’s organizational 
preference for its use, its flexibility for algorithm design and testing, and its built-in 
portability to programming languages such as C and C++. The CA algorithm developed 
in MATLAB code (m-code) is executed in the MATLAB environment and tested in ideal 
simulations containing three degree-of-freedom dynamics and perfect tracking of 
commands. The algorithm consists of six MATLAB functions in separate m-files. Table 
3-5 gives descriptions of these functions and Appendix H contains full listings of the 
MATLAB code. 
4.1. MATLAB Algorithm Deployment 
Implementation of the collision avoidance algorithm into external applications 
requires auto-coding of the algorithm into a C shared library and supporting files with 
MATLAB’s Compiler application. The compiler allows many user options; the 
configuration chosen for this algorithm generates the necessary file types in Table 3-
6. 
Table 3-6:  Necessary MATLAB Compiler Generated Files 
File Type File Extension 
Dynamic link library *.dll 
Static library *.lib 
Header file *.h 
CTF file  *.ctf 
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Additional C files are generated, but are not necessary. The following commands at 
the MATLAB prompt will auto-code the collision avoidance algorithm and return the 
files listed in Table 3-6. 
mcc –W lib:CCAA –T link:lib mult_uas_aa cc_pn_aa f_collisioncone4 wrap_mpi2pi 
wrap_pos wrap_neg   
The names of the files are specified by the lib:CCAA option. This will name all 
associated files with different extensions CCAA.xxx, where xxx represents one of the 
extensions in Table 3-6.  
4.2. C++ Application and GUI Development 
Once the necessary compiler-generated files are available, the collision 
avoidance algorithm can be deployed to an external application. The Kestrel 
Developer’s Kit, an add-on package available from Procerus Technologies, is the 
interface to Virtual Cockpit and the Kestrel Autopilot necessary for user-developed 
applications to communicate with the aircraft. The CA algorithm is integrated with 
the GCS using this Kit and MATLAB Compiler Runtime (MCR), an application that 
must be distributed with a MATLAB Compiler-created application. The CA 
algorithm is linked to Virtual Cockpit through library functions and interfaces in the 
Developer’s Kit. A graphical user interface (GUI) and associated C++ functions were 
developed and written to process information from Virtual Cockpit for input to the 
CA algorithm and to process commands from the algorithm and send to the 
autopilots. Functions contained in the MCR are necessary to create the input and 
output structure required by the collision avoidance algorithm shared library. Figure 
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3-10 is the GUI for UAS collision avoidance monitoring and defining user 
parameters, in addition to other unrelated developmental testing windows.  
 
Figure 3-10:  Collision Avoidance Application GUI 
The collision avoidance GUI displays its Virtual Cockpit status information in the 
title bar. The lower right quadrant of the GUI is the collision avoidance display and 
configuration area (CADC). All other displays are for additional variable monitoring. 
The CADC display matrix shows the user which agents (i.e. UAS) are being 
processed by the algorithm and are identified by their Agent ID number. Currently, 
the GUI is compatible with up to four UAS platforms. This corresponds with current 
operational mission configurations that use four UAS. The next row in the matrix is a 
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binary flag informing the user whether the respective UAS has a conflict. If a conflict 
exists, the flag is a one, and the guidance commands from the algorithm appear in the 
remaining matrix locations. Under the agent matrix are user-defined parameter 
controls. Default settings appear when the GUI is initiated, but can be changed at 
runtime by the user and sent to the algorithm by pressing the appropriate button. The 
user-defined variables are described in Table 3-7. 
Table 3-7:  User Parameters, CA GUI 
Parameter Description Default Value Units 
Range Maximum range to begin 
executing collision avoidance 
algorithm 
400 m 
Lateral  Lateral minimum separation 
distance 
30 m 
Vertical Vertical minimum separation 
distance (altitude offset) 
10 m 
 
The default values were defined iteratively by running several simulations. 
The default maximum range value allows ample time for the aircraft to align 
themselves for collision encounters while still challenging the algorithm to provide 
sufficient avoidance commands. This is a function of typical speeds for the aircraft, 
and would need to be changed for other platforms. The default separation values were 
selected to account for uncertainty in aircraft trajectories. They are large enough so 
that CA will still be activated even if the aircraft are not precisely flying the desired 
path. The separation values are a function of typical aircraft speeds and accuracy in 
maintaining desired trajectories and would need to be changed for other aircraft.  
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There exists a tradeoff when integrating this CA algorithm into different UAS 
platforms. At large ranges relative to the size and speed of a particular aircraft, more 
uncertainty exists when determining if the aircraft are on a collision course because of 
noisy measurements and the possibility of maneuvers. This uncertainty can be 
reduced by waiting until the aircraft are closer together before commanding CA 
maneuvers. The tradeoff exists between reducing the CA range and the maneuver 
capability of the aircraft. A sufficient amount of range and synonymously time must 
be available for the aircraft to maintain separation. Too little range will increase the 
possibility of violating minimum separation. Too much range increases the false 
alarm rate.  
Novel methods of processing UAS information from multiple platforms and 
organizing the data for use in the CA algorithm are developed. First, it is necessary to 
understand how information is received and sent to Virtual Cockpit and the 
autopilots. Data packets are wirelessly transmitted between Virtual Cockpit and the 
Kestrel Autopilot. Many types of packets are defined by Procerus and each type 
contains different data. Therefore, for a particular algorithm, the proper packets that 
contain data required by the algorithm must be identified and received by the 
application. For the CA algorithm, two specific packets are required for proper 
operation, and one particular packet is optional. The packets are also specific to a 
single platform and contain only its information. Communication between the C++ 
CA application is configured so packet information is passed directly from Virtual 
Cockpit to the algorithm for processing. Consequently, packets received by the 
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application must be sorted for the proper packet type and sorted for their respective 
platforms. Platforms are identified in Virtual Cockpit by an Agent ID number. The 
processing scheme for packet data identifies any Agent ID number and determines 
whether or not a packet has been received from that platform. If not, it is a newly 
recognized platform and is added to a persistent list of IDs. A flow diagram of this 
portion of the algorithm is shown in Figure 3-11. 
 
Figure 3-11:  Agent ID Processing 
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Next, the particular packet type is recorded and appropriate data is accessed in 
that packet. Recorded algorithm input data is updated using the new packet data. 
Another persistent list is maintained by the processing scheme; it is a list of the 
packet types that have been received for a particular platform. This is done so the 
application tracks whether each platform has the minimum amount of information to 
execute the CA algorithm. If so, the platform is said to be “full-state”. 
The CA algorithm accepts state data for any number of UAS. However, due to 
communication limitations, only a single packet for a single UAS is collected at each 
measurement epoch. Thus, a particular set of UAS state data is added to the input 
arrays sent to the algorithm if and only if there is full state data for that UAS. That is, 
the two required packets for that UAS have been received and its respective input 
array elements have been populated. Regardless of whether the current packet 
information is used at that particular epoch, the data is used to populate the 
appropriate array element and saved for the next epoch. If full state data does not 
exist for any detected UAS or exists for only one UAS, then the CA algorithm is not 
executed. 
As eluded to previously in this section, packet information is sorted according 
to new and existing Agent IDs, and UAS state information is added to the input arrays 
as they achieve full state information. Hence, the input and output arrays to and from 
the CA algorithm are dynamically sized at runtime. This is facilitated by MCR library 
functions that perform all memory allocation tasks automatically and appropriate 
array sizing in the MATLAB code before compiling.  
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4.3. Collision Avoidance Algorithm/Autopilot Interface 
In Section 4.2, the direct pass-through of the packet information from the 
autopilot, through Virtual Cockpit, and finally to the collision avoidance C++ 
application is discussed. Also, extraction of UAS state information from the packet 
data is mentioned. The packets are structured so specific data always resides in a 
packet location. Specific state variables can therefore be withdrawn from the packet 
in short order. Procerus Technologies provides detailed information on the packet 
structure of the Kestrel Autopilot system in its Communications Documentation. A 
detailed interface description specific to this CA algorithm is provided in Appendix 
A. This description provides packet locations of required UAS states for the CA 
algorithm, as well as a thorough description of the variables themselves.  
 
Figure 3-12:  Collision Avoidance Command Processing 
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A similar process to extracting information from received Kestrel Autopilot 
packets is used to populate transmittable packets with guidance command information 
from the CA algorithm, if necessary. Figure 3-12 shows a flow diagram of the 
guidance command processing. This diagram is initiated with new packet processing, 
described above, that is an extremely non-trivial process.  
The CA algorithm is executed and returns binary flags to denote conflicts: 
zero for no conflict and one for at least one conflict. Conflict flags are returned for 
each UAS. If a conflict exists, then it is determined whether this is a new conflict or 
an existing conflict. If new, the UAS is switched to MANUAL mode, and the 
guidance commands provided by the CA algorithm are sent to the UAS. The mode 
switch is controlled by a callback function that populates the proper Kestrel autopilot 
packet with the mode identifier and instructs Virtual Cockpit to transmit the packet to 
the UAS autopilot. The command transmission is also facilitated by callback 
functions that populate the proper transmission packet with the command in the 
appropriate packet location. As with the mode switch, Virtual Cockpit transmits this 
packet directly to the UAS autopilot. If the current conflict is an existing conflict, 
then the UAS is already in MANUAL mode, and only commands are transmitted. If 
no conflict exists, but one did exist for that UAS at the last measurement epoch, then 
the UAS is switched back to NAV mode. If no conflict existed in the last epoch or 
exists in the current epoch, then the collision detection algorithm continues to collect 
new packets and monitors the airspace without issuing commands. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
1. Chapter Overview 
Chapter IV discusses the tests performed on the CA algorithm and the pertinent 
results obtained from each type of test. Simulation results are discussed in sequential 
order from the least complexity and uncertainty to the greatest. Simulations include ideal 
simulations performed in MATLAB, SIL simulations performed in Virtual Cockpit and 
Aviones, an aerial vehicle simulator, and finally, HIL simulations performed with Virtual 
Cockpit, Aviones, and the Kestrel Autopilot. Testing is concluded with flight tests 
performed with BATCAMs, Virtual Cockpit, and all other required hardware.  
Each test is conducted with the same scenario sets. The sets are test cases that 
describe particular encounter geometries. A full spectrum of cases is used to evaluate the 
robustness of the algorithm. In flight test, the UAS was placed in collision encounters that 
included altitude separation for safety purposes. The minimum separation volume was 
defined large enough in flight test to activate collision avoidance even though a near-mid-
air close-encounter relative to the size of the aircraft did not occur. Scenarios consist of a 
span of engagement angles (i.e. the angles at which the nominal trajectories of two 
aircraft meet). Opposing trajectories, 180° engagement angle, are called Head-on 
encounters. Trajectories with less than 180° and greater than 90° engagement angles are 
called Approaching encounters. A 90° engagement angle is an Abeam encounter. And 
finally, an engagement angle of less than 90° is a Converging encounter. Figure 4-1 
depicts these encounters visually. 
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Figure 4-1:  Test Case Geometries 
Virtual Cockpit’s standard telemetry recording feature was utilized for all testing. 
The recorded telemetry in flight test is data transmitted from the autopilot down to the 
GCS. This data gives a clear indication of commands and responses as reported by the 
autopilot, but is bounded by the rate of transmission. No communications between the 
CA algorithm and Virtual Cockpit are recorded because this data would be uncorrelated 
in time with actual packets received by the autopilot.  
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2. Simulation Results 
2.1. Ideal 
Ideal simulations were performed for a two-ship encounter at each of the 
engagement geometries discussed above. Three degree-of-freedom dynamics with 
perfect tracking of commands is assumed. The CA commands essentially control the 
magnitude and direction of the velocity vector of the aircraft. Reference [28] proves 
that the guidance law converges for a proportional gain greater than one. For 
simplicity, the gain was set to the next positive integer value satisfying the 
convergence property. Hence, the guidance law proportional gain was set to two for 
all subsequent tests.  
 
Figure 4-2:  Ideal Head-on Simulation Trajectories 
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The results for the head-on encounter are shown in Figure 4-2. The closest 
point of approach is denoted as CPA and is shown in the figure as stars on each of the 
trajectories. Dashed circles represent the horizontal minimum separation at CPA. 
CPA representations are the same for all subsequent top-view figures for all 
encounters. The two UAS are initialized on coincident trajectories and flying in 
opposite directions at a nominal speed of 14 m/sec. This nominal trajectory is shown 
in the figure as a dashed black line. The UAS begin their maneuvers after the 
minimum CA range, 400 m, is reached. 400 m is the default value discussed in 
Chapter III. Avoidance commands last approximately 2.5 sec, 4 to 6.5 sec in the 
simulation, and CPA occurs at 19.5 sec into the simulation. The maneuvers follow the 
commands shown in Figure 4-3 generated by the proportional navigation guidance.  
 
Figure 4-3:  Ideal Head-on Simulation Avoidance Algorithm Commands 
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Attention should be paid to the intuitiveness of the commands generated by 
the CA guidance. The turn rate commands, as expected, are symmetric and have the 
same sign because each aircraft’s approach to the collision point is a mirror image of 
the other. The coordinated flight path rate commands are opposite in sign, but not 
symmetric. This is due to the cone bounds used in the guidance for a particular UAS 
are rotating at different rates as the aircraft climb and dive in relation to each other. 
The translational acceleration commands are the remaining components of the 
proportional navigation acceleration command ensuring it is perpendicular to the 
appropriate cone bound. It is clear that the UAS are within CA range at 
approximately four seconds into the simulation. 
The ideal algorithm commands must be transformed for compatibility with the 
Kestrel autopilot. The transformed commands are also calculated in the ideal 
simulations. These commands for the head-on case are shown in Figure 4-4. The 
Kestrel autopilot commands are speed (V), integrated from the translational 
acceleration command, turn rate (dψ/dt), which is the negative of the rate of change of 
alpha, and pitch angle (θ), which is assumed to equal flight path angle, and is 
integrated from flight path rate. 
The aircraft slant range is plotted with the minimum CA range and the 
minimum separation distance in Figure 4-5. The avoidance maneuver commands start 
at approximately four seconds into the simulation. This corresponds to the maximum 
range allowed for CA (400 m). Also, CPA corresponds to near-tangency of the range 
curve to the minimum limit at 19.5 sec.  
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Figure 4-4:  Ideal Head-on Simulation Kestrel Autopilot Commands 
 
Figure 4-5:  Ideal Head-on Simulation Range 
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The altitude of each aircraft is shown in Figure 4-6 along with the vertical 
separation, VO (Vertical Offset), dashed lines. It is clear in Figure 4-2 that the aircraft 
maintain horizontal separation but are also vertically separated now by almost eight 
meters. This is because both horizontal and vertical channels continue commanding 
until one achieves its perceived minimum separation. The separation is perceived 
because the aircraft may not follow their nominal trajectory after the avoidance 
maneuvers due to navigation commands or other obstacles to avoid. Figures for the 
other two-ship encounters, Approaching, Abeam, and Converging, are in Appendix 
C.  
 
Figure 4-6:  Ideal Head-on Simulation Altitude 
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avoid both of the other UAS approaching the point. Without coordination of 
commands in the horizontal plane, the geometry of the encounter and the guidance 
equations command coherent maneuvers reflecting the symmetry of the encounter. 
Figure 4-7 shows the trajectories of this three-ship encounter.  
 
Figure 4-7:  Ideal Three-Ship Simulation Trajectories 
It is clear from the trajectories and the minimum separation areas shown with 
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Figure 4-8:  Ideal Three-Ship Simulation Avoidance Algorithm Commands 
 
Figure 4-9:  Ideal Three-Ship Simulation Kestrel Commands 
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Distinct ranges (see Figure 4-10) between UAS are shown as ‘R 1-2’, range between 
UAS 1 and UAS 2, ‘R 1-3’, range between UAS 1 and UAS 3, and ‘R 2-3’, range 
between UAS 2 and UAS 3. All UAS maintain lateral separation with each other and 
each encounter is temporally symmetric.  
 
Figure 4-10:  Ideal Three-Ship Simulation Range 
 
Figure 4-11:  Ideal Three-Ship Simulation Altitude 
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Altitude (see Figure 4-11) displays the same pattern as the two-ship 
encounters except for one important feature. Now that there are three UAS, two will 
adjust their flight path in the same vertical direction. The burden of maintaining 
separation for these two aircraft is now solely placed on the horizontal maneuvers 
which were successful. 
2.2. Software-in-the-Loop 
SIL simulations were configured and executed on a single laptop in Virtual 
Cockpit’s loop-back mode. Aviones was configured so that it used its default aircraft 
dynamics model and was started first. Once Aviones is running, Virtual Cockpit can 
be opened and Agents can be added with distinct Agent IDs and set to operate in SIL 
mode. Once added, these UAS and their respective Agent IDs appear in Aviones. The 
Aviones graphics screen appears as in Figure 4-12. 
 
Figure 4-12:  Aviones with Agents 
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Virtual Cockpit’s GUI is designed for interactive mission set-up, both before 
UAS launch and after. Waypoints are added to a particular scenario so that the 
encounter will be at the appropriate engagement angle for each test case. This does 
not, unfortunately, guarantee that the UAS will always encounter each other in the 
desired geometry and location. Significant amounts of re-routing were necessary after 
waypoint following in navigation mode was initiated to align the aircraft properly. 
Aircraft dynamics and autopilot responses were the causes of configuring the 
encounters manually.  
Table 4-1:  Manual Mode Collision Avoidance Autopilot Settings 
Name Setting 
Level 1 Loops  
Roll  Checked 
Roll Rate Checked 
Pitch Checked 
Pitch Rate Checked 
Yaw Rate Unchecked 
Throttle “Airspeed” 
Level 2 Loops  
Pitch Dynamic Input “Fixed” 
 
Waypoint following is achieved in navigation (NAV) mode for all UAS. 
Collision avoidance operates in manual (MAN) mode when commanding maneuvers 
and returns control of the UAS back to NAV mode once the collision threat has been 
abated. Modes were configured in Virtual Cockpit for each control loop in the 
autopilot. For instance, in MAN mode, a user can select the pitch loop to control 
either airspeed or altitude. These settings must be configured appropriately for all 
UAS autopilots to obey CA commands properly. The MAN mode configuration for 
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CA in SIL will also apply to HIL and flight test operations. Proper CA MAN settings 
are shown in Table 4-1. 
To access these settings in Virtual Cockpit, follow the path below starting at 
the main window menu ‘Settings->Autopilot Config’. The ‘Global Settings’ window 
will appear and will reflect the currently selected Agent autopilot. The following 
steps must be completed for each autopilot.  
1) Expand Mode Configuration 
2) Expand Manual Mode 
3) Expand both PID Loops lists (Level 1 and Level 2 Loops) 
4) Set variables according to Table 4-1 
5) Press Upload Config 
6) Press Update Flash 
7) Repeat Steps 1-6 for each UAS 
The MAN mode autopilot settings for CA ensure that the autopilot control 
loops do not generate conflicting commands. The Level 2 loop setting ensures the 
aircraft will follow the CA Kestrel pitch command. Level 1 loop settings ensure that 
the throttle controls airspeed in accordance with the CA Kestrel airspeed command. A 
combination of the other Level 1 loops controls turn rate according to the CA Kestrel 
turn rate command.   
Once Aviones and Virtual Cockpit are initialized and properly configured, the 
aircraft are launched. It takes combinations of active waypoint switching and timing 
to get them out of phase by 180 deg. Once they are in opposing route locations, the 
 
66 
CA GUI is executed and the CA algorithm immediately begins communicating with 
virtual cockpit, receiving packets, and monitoring the UAS. The GUI is monitored as 
the UAS cross the 400 m range limit, as the CA algorithm detects the collision, and as 
it switches the UAS to MAN mode from NAV mode. Immediately after the switch, 
commands populate the Agent matrix in the CA GUI. Mode switches are visually 
distinguishable in Virtual Cockpit because the current mode button is highlighted in 
green and all others are grey. 
 
Figure 4-13:  SIL Head-on Simulation Trajectories 
SIL test cases are completed in the same manner as the ideal simulations. 
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commanded to fly back and forth between the same waypoints and along the same 
path, but 180 deg out of phase. This pattern will result in a collision encounter at the 
center point along the route. The waypoints are spaced enough to allow the aircraft to 
align themselves along the straight route after their turn around the waypoint. The 
maximum CA range and separation volumes are identical to those in the ideal 
simulations. Figure 4-13 shows the resultant trajectories for the SIL Head-on test 
case. The UAS successfully maintained lateral separation and obeyed the CA 
commands.  
 
Figure 4-14:  SIL Head-on Simulation Airspeed Response 
Figures 4-14 through 4-16 show the CA commands for each UAS along with 
the autopilot mode. The mode crossing from NAV to MAN illustrates the collision 
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Commands are initiated when the mode is switched at 232.17 sec into the simulation, 
and CPA occurs at 242.05 sec. Using collision timelines like this (10 sec elapsed from 
detection to CPA), CA algorithms can be tailored to particular aircraft and particular 
encounter situations in future research. 
 
Figure 4-15:  SIL Head-on Simulation Turn Rate Response1
The airspeed commands and response demonstrate acceptable command 
change tracking, but there exists a steady-state error throughout the simulation. This 
is not a result of the CA algorithm because it also exists in NAV mode. The error is 
caused by control loop settings in each autopilot’s proportional-integral-derivative 
(PID) controller, and could be reduced by additional tuning of each PID controller for 
 
                                                 
1 ‘Des’ signal not recorded and is all zeroes 
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this particular aircraft model. In flight test, PID settings must be tuned for each 
aircraft separately.  
 
Figure 4-16:  SIL Head-on Simulation Pitch Response 
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that this is actually another steady-state error. The effect of pitch response can clearly 
be seen in the altitude plot and altitude separation is minimal at the end of the 
collision encounter. 
 
Figure 4-17:  SIL Head-on Simulation Range 
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The UAS do not achieve altitude separation because of the slow response of 
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caused UAS 1 to be above UAS 2 at CPA (242.05 sec) even though UAS 1 was 
commanded to pitch down and UAS 2 was commanded to pitch up. These 
uncertainties are inevitable, and must be taken into account by the robustness of the 
algorithm (i.e. multiple dimensions for separation and sufficiently large separation 
volume definitions).  
 
Figure 4-18:  SIL Head-on Simulation Altitude 
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repercussions are increased collision likelihood because of delayed responses and 
poor mission performance because of large deviations from the nominal trajectory. 
This is a system-dependent issue that is not an indication of the CA algorithm’s 
performance. Fortunately, the Mode switch from MAN to NAV at the beginning of 
the encounter happens immediately, and commands are received by the autopilots that 
successfully deconflict the aircraft.  
Table 4-2:  SIL Simulation Results, Key Statistics 
Parameter 
Value 
Head-on Approach Abeam Converge 
Time of Minimum Lateral Separation 242.05 s 462.44 s 121.15 s 153.47 s 
Minimum Lateral Separation 37.5 m 49.26 s 45.18 m 35.41 m 
Time of Minimum Slant Range 242.05 s 462.44 s 121.15 s 152.67 s 
Minimum Slant Range 35.83 m 49.69 m 45.73 m 37.05 m 
UAS1 Alt at Tmin,LS 307 m 304 m 297.33 m 306 m 
UAS2 Alt at Tmin,LS 304.5 m 297.17 m 304.17 m 293.83 m 
UAS1 Alt at Tmin,SR 307 m 304 m 297.33 m 305.33 m 
UAS2 Alt at Tmin,SR 304.5 m 297.17 m 304.17 m 295 m 
 
Figures for the other two-ship encounters, Approaching, Abeam, and 
Converging, are in Appendix D. Key statistics of each two-ship encounter are shown 
in Table 4-2. Lateral separation was achieved in each test case. Although altitude 
separation was not necessary due to the lateral separation, the converging case did 
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achieve full vertical separation. For the other cases, pitch changes were commanded 
by the CA system but the dynamic lag between pitch changes and altitude changes 
was too slow. Airspeed commands frequently exhibited oscillating patterns, but it is 
assessed that these are caused by autopilot attempts to overwrite the CA command. If 
this was caused by the avoidance algorithm, either the turn rate or pitch command and 
response would exhibit the same type of pattern, because each of the three 
independent commands are components of a single change in the velocity vector 
command. The autopilot may overwrite commands depending on control loop 
settings beyond what a user can adjust (see Table 4-1).  
A three-ship encounter was tested in SIL for an encounter identical to the 
ideal three-ship simulation. All three UAS have even angular spacing and are 
intended to collide near the origin of the local reference frame. Uncertainties, such as 
aircraft dynamics, autopilot command tracking, and communication delays, will 
inevitably cause differences in the responses, but it is important to demonstrate 
functional determinism (the ability to repeat results within bounds given uncertainty 
in the system). By quantitatively repeating ideal response patterns in the SIL 
simulations within some margin of error, one can transition to higher levels of 
complexity with confidence.  
Figure 4-19 shows the results of the three-ship SIL simulation. Results are 
very similar to ideal simulations, except for UAS 3 turning in the opposite direction. 
This is caused by non-ideal geometry and dynamics-effects at the beginning of the 
encounter. The discrepant turn direction does not negatively affect the outcome of the 
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encounter, and all aircraft avoid each other in a similar manner to the ideal 
simulations.  
 
Figure 4-19:  SIL Three-Ship Simulation Trajectories 
 
Figure 4-20:  SIL Three-Ship Simulation Trajectories, Zoomed to Origin 
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Figure 4-20 is a close-up view of the locations of the CPA. The lateral 
minimum separation areas are distinguishable by two factors. The line color of each 
circle coincides with the color of each UAS’s trajectory. The line type represents each 
distinct CPA for each UAS combination. For instance, CPA between UAS 1 to 2 is 
identical to CPA between UAS 2 to 1, and only one is shown. Key parameters of the 
encounter are shown in Table 4-3. 
Table 4-3:  SIL Three-ship Simulation Results, Key Statistics 
Parameter 
Value 
1-2 (2-1) 1-3 (3-1) 2-3 (3-2)2 
Time of Minimum Lateral Separation 176.18 s 176.16 s 187.46 s 
Minimum Lateral Separation 44.37 m 32.84 m 20.59 m 
Time of Minimum Slant Range 176.18 s 176.16 s 187.46 s 
Minimum Slant Range 44.54 m 34.09 m 22.03 m 
UAS1 Alt at Tmin,LS 308.17 m 307.83 m  
UAS2 Alt at Tmin,LS 304 m  304.83 m 
UAS3 Alt at Tmin,LS  299.33 m 298.33 m 
UAS1 Alt at Tmin,SR 308.17 m 307.83 m  
UAS2 Alt at Tmin,SR 304 m  304.83 m 
UAS3 Alt at Tmin,SR  299.33 m 298.33 m 
                                                 
2 Vertical separation was likely achieved, but not shown in data because of irregular measurements. Refer 
to discussion following chart for further information.  
 
76 
Unlike the ideal simulations where separation was maintained for every 
encounter, UAS 2 and 3 violate their lateral minimum separation criteria. This is due 
to communication delays causing avoidance commands to be executed seconds after 
they are generated by the avoidance algorithm. Although they do not maintain the 30 
m separation, the UAS are still separated laterally by over 20 m, and are reported to 
have 6.5 m of altitude separation. Thus, uncertainties have caused suspected loss of 
separation even in SIL simulations. Furthermore, measurement uncertainty can skew 
the results because measurements are taken at discrete time intervals and must be 
sufficiently small to recreate the close-encounter spatially and temporally. Thirty 
meters was used as the minimum lateral separation for subsequent tests, but further 
studies in the future should concentrate on defining separation volumes with 
statistical encounter descriptions from Monte Carlo simulations.  
The guidance commands are shown in Figures 4-21 through 4-23. Airspeed 
commands exhibit the same steady-state error as in the two-ship simulations. Turn 
rate commands are acceptable in pattern and magnitude, but because of the deficiency 
in Virtual Cockpit data recording, a definitive comparison of command tracking 
cannot be made. The pitch commands have poor tracking which causes difficulty in 
maintaining altitude separation at the CPA.  
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Figure 4-21:  SIL Three-Ship Simulation Airspeed Avoidance Command 
 
Figure 4-22:  SIL Three-Ship Simulation Turn Rate Avoidance Command 
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Figure 4-23:  SIL Three-Ship Simulation Pitch Avoidance Command 
Recorded range data, Figure 4-24, shows evidence of data transmission 
delays, another communication issue. Discrete measurements are recorded at large 
time steps during the period of CA. As a result, CPA estimates may not be accurate 
due to sporadic range measurements. Altitude measurements, Figure 4-25, show 
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Figure 4-24:  SIL Three-Ship Simulation Range 
 
Figure 4-25:  SIL Three-Ship Simulation Altitude 
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2.3. Hardware-in-the-Loop 
Hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) tests required significantly more test preparation 
than SIL tests. The autopilots were configured as though they were on an actual 
aircraft. They are battery powered with an antenna attached for wireless 
communication with the communication box (COMM BOX). The difference between 
actual operation and HIL is that the autopilots communicate with Aviones for 
simulated aircraft dynamics by configuring Aviones to communicate through USB 
communication ports and connecting the autopilots to these ports with adaptors. The 
COMM BOX is attached to the computer running Virtual Cockpit which is 
configured for autopilot operation in HIL mode and communicates with the COMM 
BOX.  
 
Figure 4-26:  Single UAS HIL Set-up 
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Figure 4-26 shows the HIL set-up for a single vehicle UAS. For a multiple 
vehicle UAS, which is the case for the CA testing, each autopilot must have its own 
computer, battery, antenna, and Aviones instantiation. The COMM BOX will 
communicate with each autopilot and transfer communications to and from Virtual 
Cockpit.  
Each autopilot is configured as in Table 4-1 and test cases are identical to 
those in SIL testing. Added complexity and uncertainty in HIL includes firmware and 
autopilot processing, battery power, and wireless communication. Communication 
between the CA application and the autopilot is now subject to wireless 
communication delays and dropouts in addition to independent firmware and 
autopilot processing instead of software-only processing on a single computer.  
 
Figure 4-27:  HIL Head-on Simulation Trajectories 
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Trajectories for the HIL head-on encounter are shown in Figure 4-27. It 
falsely appears in this horizontal plane view that the aircraft collide. However, in 
Figure 4-28, the altitude time-history shows that the aircraft achieved altitude 
separation at CPA and successfully avoided a collision.  
 
Figure 4-28:  HIL Head-on Simulation Altitude 
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the collision cone algorithm and guidance logic. This single encounter shows the 
importance of multi-dimensional commands in a geometric algorithm. 
 
Figure 4-29:  HIL Head-on Simulation Airspeed Avoidance Command 
The CA commands are shown in Figures 4-29 through 4-31. As alluded to 
previously, the turn rate commands are opposite in sign, which for a head-on 
trajectory turns the aircraft in the same direction. It can be seen in the trajectory figure 
the aircraft are still oscillating around the nominal trajectory at the point of CA 
activation. The aircraft were most likely at an orientation that warranted the 
commanded turn rates, but based on future knowledge of the desired trajectory, they 
are undesirable.  
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Figure 4-30:  HIL Head-on Simulation Turn Rate Avoidance Command 
 
Figure 4-31:  HIL Head-on Simulation Pitch Avoidance Command 
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In Figure 4-31, the aircraft pitch response to the avoidance commands 
contains a one to two degree steady-state error. The pitch commands from the CA 
algorithm for UAS 1 are positive and for UAS 2 are negative and should separate the 
aircraft. However, both responses are positive because the error is larger than the 
negative commands for UAS 2. This results in both aircraft climbing as seen in 
Figure 4-28 but at much different rates. This is an autopilot issue requiring PID gain 
tuning, but it did not cause loss of altitude separation. The airspeed command for 
UAS 2 remains at the nominal speed, but this is also an effect of autopilot 
configuration. The speed changes commanded by the CA algorithm are not large 
enough for interpretation by the autopilot.  
 
Figure 4-32:  HIL Head-on Simulation Range 
200 205 210 215 220 225 230
0
200
400
600
t, s
R
, m
 
 
Man
Nav
M
od
e
Actual
CA Limit
Lat Min Sep
Mode(1)
Mode(2)
 
86 
The range plot, Figure 4-32, indicates loss of lateral separation, but roughly 
shows the smaller altitude separation. Figures for the other two-ship encounters, 
Approaching, Abeam, and Converging, are in Appendix E. Table 4-4 shows key 
statistics of each of the two-ship encounters. 
Table 4-4:  HIL Simulation Results, Key Statistics 
Parameter 
Value 
Head-on Approach Abeam Converge 
Time of Minimum Lateral Separation 223.47 s 584.83 s 608.36 s 189.2 s 
Minimum Lateral Separation 7.3 m 24.77 s 27.83 m 65.2 m 
Time of Minimum Slant Range 223.47 s 584.83 s 608.36 s 189.2 s 
Minimum Slant Range 13.54 m 27.01 m 31.85 m 66.26 m 
UAS1 Alt at Tmin,LS 317.33 m 316.83 m 315.67 m 300.67 m 
UAS2 Alt at Tmin,LS 306.5 m 306.33 m 299.67 m 308.00 m 
UAS1 Alt at Tmin,SR 317.33 m 316.83 m 315.67 m 300.67 m 
UAS2 Alt at Tmin,SR 306.5 m 306.33 m 299.67 m 308.00 m 
 
HIL two-ship simulations stressed the importance of minimum altitude 
separation by means of a pitch command. Only the Converging test case maintained 
the full lateral separation, though the Abeam and Approaching cases were over 20 m 
and also achieved altitude separation. Three of the cases also achieved their full 
altitude separation. The HIL results departed from the SIL results in separation trends, 
but are favorable in their own right and display successful CA. Communication 
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“buffer” delay issues, similar to those in SIL testing, caused delays in Mode 
switching back to NAV mode after CA was successful. 
 
Figure 4-33:  HIL Three-ship Simulation Trajectories 
A three-ship HIL test is completed and compared to the SIL test. Figure 4-33 
shows the resultant trajectories, and Figure 4-34 is a close-up view of the origin and 
the CPA locations. The CPA between distinct pairs of UAS is distinguished in the 
same manner used in SIL; color represents a particular UAS and line type denotes a 
distinct UAS pair. UAS 3 noticeably deviated from its nominal trajectory before the 
collision encounter and CA initiation. Its waypoint following, albeit poor, further 
challenged the CA algorithm because of the maneuvering.  
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Figure 4-34:  HIL Three-ship Simulation Trajectories, Zoomed to Origin 
Table 4-5 shows key statistics for the HIL three-ship simulation. UAS 1 and 2 
achieved more than the required altitude separation at CPA, UAS 1 and 3 also 
achieved full altitude separation as well as nearly achieving lateral separation, and 
UAS 2 and 3 achieved full lateral separation. Unfortunately, the separations cannot be 
fully attributed to CA commands. It will be seen in later figures that the Mode switch 
for CA for UAS 2 and 3 occurs after CPA. This is undoubtedly due to communication 
delays because commands are still issued after CPA, gleaning more evidence of a 
communication buffer that stores packets for transmission in a queue. 
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Table 4-5:  HIL Three-ship Simulation Results, Key Statistics 
Parameter 
Value 
1-2 (2-1) 1-3 (3-1) 2-3 (3-2) 
Time of Minimum Lateral Separation 874.09 s 872.01 s 872.01 s 
Minimum Lateral Separation 15.05 m 25.36 m 30.64 m 
Time of Minimum Slant Range 874.09 s 872.01 s 872.01 s 
Minimum Slant Range 22.46 m 30.35 m 30.66 m 
UAS1 Alt at Tmin,LS 317 m 316 m  
UAS2 Alt at Tmin,LS 300 m  300 m 
UAS3 Alt at Tmin,LS  299 m 299 m 
UAS1 Alt at Tmin,SR 317 m 316 m  
UAS2 Alt at Tmin,SR 300 m  300 m 
UAS3 Alt at Tmin,SR  299 m 299 m 
 
Although individual separation criteria were met, it is important to understand 
why some separation criteria in particular dimensions were not achieved. One glaring 
piece of evidence exists in the airspeed command, shown in Figure 4-35. It is unclear 
whether no airspeed commands actually were received by the autopilots, or whether 
they were too small to be interpreted by the autopilots, but no speed changes were 
commanded. They were unquestionably commanded by the CA algorithm because 
the other commands were processed by the autopilots. 
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Figure 4-35:  HIL Three-ship Simulation Airspeed Command 
Both combinations of failed lateral separation involved UAS 1. It can be seen 
in Figure 4-36 why this possibly happened. UAS 1 did not respond to or did not 
receive a turn rate command. Unfortunately, because turn rate commands cannot be 
recorded, it is impossible to tell which is the case. It is speculated that if UAS 1 had 
responded to a turn rate command, the UAS 1-2 and UAS 1-3 combinations would 
have achieved lateral separation because 1) UAS 2-3 successfully achieved lateral 
separation with their commands which also included separation considerations for 
UAS 1 (global approach), and 2) UAS 1 responded successfully to its vertical 
commands to achieve altitude separation.  
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Figure 4-36:  HIL Three-ship Simulation Turn Rate Avoidance Command 
 
Figure 4-37:  HIL Three-ship Simulation Pitch Avoidance Command 
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UAS 1 achieved altitude separation from both UAS 2 and 3 because it 
immediately received and responded to its pitch command (see Figure 4-37). UAS 2 
and 3 did not achieve altitude separation. This, again, is undoubtedly due to them 
receiving their pitch commands long after (estimated to be 10-20 sec) they were 
actually commanded. The steps in their commands after the Mode switch are 
uncharacteristic of the guidance commands processed by the avoidance algorithm. 
They should be smooth and continuous as seen in the UAS 1 command. The 
command steps are more evidence of communication problems, seemingly due to a 
communication “bottle-neck” that transmits commands sporadically.  
Figure 4-38 and Figure 4-39 show the HIL three-ship range and altitude, 
respectively. The late Mode switches for UAS 2 and 3 are apparent in the range plot. 
UAS 1 altitude separation is evident in the altitude figure. It is curious that UAS 1 
receives and responds to its Mode switch pitch command immediately, but does not 
receive or respond to its turn rate or altitude command. After further investigation, the 
order of command transmittals in the CA algorithm code is this: 1) mode switch, 2) 
airspeed, 3) pitch, 4) turn rate. The author makes the following hypothesis about these 
curious events. The mode switch happens immediately, and the airspeed command is 
transmitted, but is too small to be processed by the autopilot. The pitch command is 
then sent successfully. The turn rate command is added to the queue, along with 
commands for UAS 2 and 3, and the queue begins to build and delays subsequently 
accumulate. Further investigation into the workings of the Kestrel libraries and how 
command packets are transmitted may begin to shed light on these peculiarities.  
 
93 
 
 
Figure 4-38:  HIL Three-ship Simulation Range 
 
Figure 4-39:  HIL Three-ship Simulation Altitude 
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3. Flight Test Results 
Flight tests were flown at Camp Atterbury, Indiana, a military installation with 
restricted airspace enabling autonomous flight in controlled airspace. An entire ground 
unit including the GCS, test support, and repair equipment was used as the test operations 
center. The GCS is equipped with the same laptop used in HIL tests along with additional 
communication and video equipment used with the BATCAM systems. The GCS test 
operations area, located in the front of the ground unit, is shown in Figure 4-40 and a test 
aircraft, BATCAM 1, is shown in Figure 4-41.  
 
Figure 4-40:  Flight Test Ground Control Station 
Detailed flight test procedures, provided in Appendix G, were written and 
presented at AFIT to a safety and technical review board for test approval prior to launch. 
Safety considerations included the ballistic footprint of debris falling in the event of an 
actual collision. Emergency procedures were written specifically for CA testing in the 
case of unresponsive BATCAM aircraft under CA control. Safety precautions included 
50 ft altitude separation warranting a relatively over-sized minimum separation volume 
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and waypoint placements that resulted in a theoretical collision point separated from the 
GCS by three times the ballistic debris footprint.  
 
Figure 4-41:  AFIT's BATCAM 1 
Flight test procedures were written for two-ship and three ship encounters at the 
engagement angles used in SIL and HIL testing. Two-ship tests at two engagement angles 
were actually flown and will be reviewed in detail in later discussions. Wind conditions 
were a cause of changes to some of the flight test procedures. Waypoint patterns were 
constructed to produce the desired collision encounters in the test range area. These 
patterns were adjusted in orientation with respect to the Camp Atterbury runway to align 
the mean wind direction perpendicular to the flight paths in order to reduce discrepancies 
in ground speed. Also, for flight paths that could not be aligned perpendicular to the wind 
direction, speed adjustments were made in Navigation mode waypoint settings to account 
for head and tail winds. The Camp Atterbury runway and two-ship CA test waypoints are 
shown in Figure 4-42. Solid lines represent planned waypoints and dashed lines represent 
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actual test waypoints after, approximately, a 20 deg counter-clockwise adjustment for 
winds. The total range between waypoints was also reduced in order to ensure the 
BATCAMs were in-view throughout the entire test.  
 
Figure 4-42:  Two-Ship Flight Test Waypoints over Camp Atterbury 
The BATCAMs in each collision encounter were separated in altitude by 50 ft. 
This separation is included for two reasons: 1) safety, and 2) BATCAM altitude holding. 
In previous flight tests of the BATCAMs, they were found to hold altitude only within 
plus or minus 30 ft. To account for this, the vertical minimum separation in the algorithm 
was set to 20 m (~65 ft) for all tests. The lateral minimum separation was also increased 
to 60 m to excite the horizontal avoidance commands and flatten out the minimum 
separation cylinder. It was found during the flight tests that significant “weaving” 
occurred in navigation mode when transitioning to the line of sight between waypoints. 
This introduced additional uncertainty in the tests for collision detection and command 
133m 
N 
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generation and was partially removed by changing cross-track settings in Virtual Cockpit 
for Navigation mode. Unfortunately, these oscillatory flight patterns were not alleviated 
entirely and are apparent in flight test data.  
3.1. Pre-flight Ground Testing 
Ground tests were completed prior to BATCAM launch to verify two issues 
that cannot be determined in HIL testing. Test personnel physically walked with 
BATCAMs in-hand towards each other as though they were actually flying and 
activated CA. In the first ground-test, an R/C Manual mode exists in the Kestrel 
system that provides radio control of the BATCAMs for a safety pilot through the 
COMM BOX to the Kestrel autopilot. To safely proceed with testing, it had to be 
shown that R/C mode could over-ride CA commands in the event the aircraft become 
unresponsive during collision encounters. This was verified in ground tests. The R/C 
mode is limited to control over only one aircraft at a time, and a switch to another 
aircraft is made in Virtual Cockpit. It was found that even though R/C control will 
supersede CA in Manual mode, Virtual Cockpit will not switch R/C control to 
another aircraft when communication blockages are present in the communication 
channels. This limitation presents additional risk to recovering unresponsive aircraft 
and was a major contributor to reducing the number of completed tests. A second 
ground test was completed to ensure the autonomous mode switching in the CA 
algorithm could complete the entire CA process with all flight test equipment 
activated. It was verified that CA can detect a collision, switch to Manual mode, issue 
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guidance commands, and return to Navigation mode autonomously with the entire 
flight test configuration.  
3.2. Flight Testing 
Two engagement angles were flown in the flight test, Head-on and 
Approaching. Multiple encounters per engagement angle, four for Head-on and two 
for Approaching, were flown and each one resulted in a positive collision detection 
and avoidance maneuver transmission. The remaining two-ship encounters and the 
three-ship encounter were not flown because of communication delay problems 
allegedly caused by a packet transmission buffer processing at a slower rate than 
command generation. This has yet to be substantiated. The last test and, ironically, 
the most successful in terms of collision avoidance data collection, resulted in both 
BATCAMs becoming unresponsive and emergency procedures were executed. Both 
aircraft were successfully recovered. The unresponsiveness is caused by a build-up of 
avoidance commands that are slowly processed even after the CA application is 
terminated. A newer version of the Kestrel autopilot is available with a faster 
processor, but the precise location of the delay in the communication system should 
be found before any equipment is acquired. 
The second Approaching encounter, and final test, resulted in the best 
encounter because of the geometric alignment at CA initiation, the aircrafts’ response 
to commands, and data quality. The trajectories for this encounter are shown in 
Figure 4-43 and the range between the aircraft is shown in Figure 4-44.  
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Figure 4-43:  Flight Test Approaching Encounter 2 Trajectories 
 
Figure 4-44:  Flight Test Approaching Encounter 2 Range 
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The mode switch to Manual mode for BATCAM 2 and BATCAM 1 CA was 
activated simultaneously at the maximum CA range as expected. The range at CPA 
for this encounter was approximately 47 m. The desired minimum separation of 60 m 
was not fully maintained, but appropriate avoidance maneuvers were commanded and 
did result in large separation distances in the presence of uncertainties. The mode 
switch and altitude are shown in Figure 4-45. It should be mentioned that even though 
the aircraft are supposed to be separated by 50 ft in altitude, it can clearly be seen that 
they hold altitude poorly in navigation mode and are nearly co-altitude at times.  
 
Figure 4-45:  Flight Test Approaching Encounter 2 Altitude 
It is peculiar that BATCAM 2 dives after its switch to CA control, but it is at a 
higher altitude than BATCAM 1. After further investigation into the vertical 
commands, BATCAM 2 was sent a positive pitch command to climb, but lost altitude 
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because of a decrease in angle of attack. The trim angle of attack was larger than the 
pitch command sent to the BATCAM. Despite the aircraft response, the algorithm 
was functioning properly and provided intuitive commands. As discussed in Chapter 
III, the interface between the CA algorithm and the Kestrel autopilot did not allow 
flight path angle commands and only offered orientation angle commands. A small 
angle of attack assumption and small dynamic delay between a pitch change and the 
resultant altitude change assumption were made for algorithm integration. The 
assumptions are shown to be inaccurate and will require changes in the algorithm 
interface to command different variables. The author has spoken with Procerus 
representatives, and climb rate commands are available in later versions of the Kestrel 
autopilot. Thus, integration improvements may be possible with updated equipment, 
although it is possible in newer versions the turn rate commands may have been 
removed. The pitch response is shown in Figure 4-46. 
After CA initiation for BATCAM 1, it is commanded to decrease altitude. It 
pitches down but has a large steady state error and maintains a positive pitch angle. 
As a result, BATCAM 1 sustains a large angle of attack and actually begins to climb. 
Both BATCAM 1 and 2 exhibited altitude responses opposite to what was expected. 
One possible explanation is wind causing large differences in airspeed and 
subsequently angle of attack, resulting in the exact opposite reaction to what is 
expected and what was commanded. In navigation mode, large oscillations can be 
seen in pitch, and observed also in the altitude plot and result in poor altitude 
tracking. In CA mode, commands are smooth and relatively benign early in the 
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encounter. This is exactly the pattern one would want in collision situations and gives 
assurance to the algorithm’s design. 
 
Figure 4-46:  Flight Test Approaching Encounter 2 Pitch Response 
The airspeed response is shown in Figure 4-47 and the turn rate response is in 
Figure 4-48. BATCAM 1 is commanded to initially increase its airspeed and then 
steadily decreases throughout the encounter. The commands to BATCAM 2 are 
constant and at a slightly lower airspeed than in navigation mode. The BATCAM 1 
response contains a steady-state error resulting in a slower airspeed, and the 
BATCAM 2 response contains a steady-state error resulting in a faster airspeed. 
These errors are caused by the BATCAMs turning into and away from the wind.  
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Figure 4-47:  Flight Test Approaching Encounter 2 Airspeed Response 
 
Figure 4-48:  Flight Test Approaching Encounter 2 Turn Rate Response 
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In SIL and HIL testing, it was not possible to record the turn rate command. 
However, in flight test, the turn rate command is recorded, but only in navigation 
mode. When in Manual mode, the command returns to zero, but not instantaneously. 
This is evidence of another autopilot control loop that generates turn rate commands 
is the one being recorded, and drifts to zero when not in navigation mode. 
Unfortunately, this still means CA turn rate commands are unavailable for recording, 
and only conjectures can be made about the response. One obvious conclusion about 
turn rate is that the measurements are extremely noisy. Only qualitative observations 
can be made, and no clear command pattern can be determined. By comparing to the 
trajectories in Figure 4-43, BATCAM 2 clearly receives a positive turn rate 
command, and BATCAM 1 also receives a positive command, though much less 
aggressive. These trends agree with those seen in Figure 4-48.  
 
Figure 4-49:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 2 Trajectories 
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One of the most successful Head-on encounters was the second one flown. 
The BATCAMs were transitioning into their waypoint following routes and turned 
towards each other at a much smaller range (200 m) than the maximum CA range 
(300 m). Both BATCAMs switched to CA mode simultaneously after the CA 
algorithm immediately detected an imminent violation of minimum separation. The 
initial encounter through CPA was well behaved and demonstrated successful 
avoidance maneuvers. The range at CPA was approximately 45 m, and is about the 
same as the Approaching encounter discussed previously (47 m). The uncertainties in 
the system and environment caused consistent deviations from the desired minimum 
separation for both of these encounters. The trajectories for this encounter are in 
Figure 4-49. The range plot, in Figure 4-50, shows the CPA at approximately 785 sec 
and then additional undesired mode switching afterwards due to the communication 
delay and subsequent command build-up.  
The excessive mode switching in Figure 4-50 after the CPA was caused by 
additional potential collision encounters. The communication delay did not allow a 
switch back to navigation mode and the BATCAMs continued processing old 
avoidance commands that introduced new encounters. After the command buffer was 
exhausted, the BATCAMs did return to navigation mode. 
BATCAM 1 switched to CA mode and began to climb, even though it was at 
a lower altitude. This disagrees with the pitch command, which was correctly 
commanded by the algorithm. BATCAM 1 is initially commanded to pitch down but 
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because of a steady state error, it maintains a positive pitch angle and climbs. The 
altitude is in Figure 4-51 and the pitch response is in Figure 4-52. 
 
Figure 4-50:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 2 Range 
 
Figure 4-51:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 2 Altitude 
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Figure 4-52:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 2 Pitch Response 
 
Figure 4-53:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 2 Airspeed Response 
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The airspeed commands, in Figure 4-53, from mode switch to CPA are well 
behaved. After the CPA, when CA should be turned off, they begin to look like a 
bang-bang type control. This is caused by the same problem seen in SIL testing where 
the CA airspeed commands are overwritten because of control loop settings beyond 
those adjusted for CA Manual mode. The turn rate commands, in Figure 4-54, behave 
as expected and exhibit commands positive in sign. As the aircraft approach CPA, 
positive turn rate commands would separate the aircraft. 
 
Figure 4-54:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 2 Turn Rate Response 
An interesting Head-on encounter, not for its alignment or data quality, but for 
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immediately detected the potential collision and initiated maneuvers for both aircraft 
while BATCAM 1 was in its turn. Sufficient separation (80 m) was still successfully 
maintained even with such close proximity prior to detection. This case shows that 
minimum separation or more can still be maintained with little time before the CPA 
by issuing aggressive commands. The trajectories for this encounter are shown in 
Figure 4-55.  
The data rate for this encounter was quite poor. For the entire collision 
encounter, data was recorded once only every few seconds and explains the 
discontinuous telemetry plots. 
 
Figure 4-55:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 4 Trajectories 
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Figure 4-56:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 4 Altitude 
 
Figure 4-57:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 4 Range 
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Altitude and range are shown in Figures 4-56 and 4-57, respectively. The 
altitude responses display consistent patterns with their associated commands. 
BATCAM 1 behaves as expected; it is commanded to pitch down and responds by 
losing altitude. BATCAM 2 is commanded to pitch up and initially begins gaining 
altitude. However, it eventually loses altitude even though it maintains airspeed. Even 
with this loss, the BATCAMs are still separated in altitude by 33 m and successfully 
surpass the minimum 20 m of separation. The rapidly changing dynamics are difficult 
to characterize because data is recorded at a slow rate, as much as five seconds 
between points. The pitch and airspeed responses are shown in Figures 4-58 and 4-59, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 4-58:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 4 Pitch Response 
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Figure 4-59:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 4 Airspeed Response 
 
Figure 4-60:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 4 Turn Rate Response 
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The trajectories in Figure 4-55 clearly show both BATCAMs receive positive 
turn rate commands. Because the measurements for turn rate are obtrusively noisy 
and infrequent, this is not apparent in the turn rate data as shown in Figure 4-60. 
Table 4-6:  Flight Test Statistics 
Parameter 
Flight 
Head-on Approach 
1 2 31 4 1 2 
Time of Minimum 
Lateral Separation 
676.74 s 785.17 s 343.88 s 253.67 s 567.76 s 750.95 s 
Minimum Lateral 
Separation 
13.19 m 42.04 m 255.22 m 80.41 m 233.97 m 45.72 m 
Time of Minimum 
Slant Range 
676.74 s 785.17 s 343.88 s 253.67 s 567.76 s 750.95 s 
Minimum Slant 
Range 
24.24 m 45.11 m 255.34 m 86.98 m 236.83 m 47.32 m 
UAS1 Alt at 
Tmin,LS 
117.00 m 130.50 m 124.33 m 107.17 m 101.83 m 134.50 m 
UAS2 Alt at 
Tmin,LS 
137.33 m 146.83 m 132.20 m 140.33 m 138.54 m 122.28 m 
UAS1 Alt at 
Tmin,SR 
117.00 m 130.50 m 124.33 m 107.17 m 101.83 m 134.50 m 
UAS2 Alt at 
Tmin,SR 
137.33 m 146.83 m 132.20 m 140.33 m 138.54 m 122.28 m 
1. Virtual Cockpit application displayed an error and closed resulting in data 
loss. Aircraft initiated “lost-comm” mode. 
 
 
Statistics for the two encounters discussed above and the remaining 
encounters flown are in Table 4-6. Plots for the remaining flights are in Appendix F. 
Head-on, Flight 1, resulted in good geometry, but only BATCAM 1 entered CA 
mode. Flight 3 of the Head-on encounters showed promising geometry and both 
BATCAMs began performing avoidance maneuvers, but Virtual Cockpit returned an 
 
114 
error and shut down. This caused “lost comm” mode in the autopilots and they were 
commanded to return to their rally points. Only the initial maneuver and commands 
was recorded. This error was an anomaly, and has never before been seen in flight 
test or bench testing.  
The first Approaching encounter was an excellent encounter for command 
generation and response, but the BATCAMs reacted much more aggressively than 
anticipated. BATCAM 1 turned nearly 180 deg and the aircraft never made a close 
approach at or near the minimum separation. These maneuvers can be partially 
attributed to wind conditions during the flight. Further investigation into the 
conversion of avoidance algorithm commands to Kestrel commands might alleviate 
some aggressive maneuvering for these particular aircraft. Additionally, the 
proportional navigation gains can be tuned for the aircraft if it is determined that they 
are accurately tracking the commands.  
3.3. Flight Test Summary 
Flight test validated the collision avoidance algorithm’s ability to perform 
collision detection and avoidance maneuver generation. The BATCAM aircraft were 
able to respond to and avoid a minimum separation volume around each other as a 
result of the CA algorithm and in the presence of environmental and system 
uncertainty. The algorithm not only generated guidance commands, it provided 
system-specific flags that initiated autonomous mode switching with the human 
operator completely out of the loop. Flight test also confirmed successful integration 
of the algorithm into the BATCAM system, although improvements need to be made. 
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Flight test showed that turn rate and airspeed commands were effectively 
commanded and sufficiently tracked to provide lateral separation. Pitch commands 
that are responsible for altitude changes did not, however, provide vertical separation. 
Assumptions made in order to use pitch commands were not valid for this particular 
aircraft and resulted in undesirable vertical responses. Aircraft telemetry data was 
sufficient to detect potential losses of separation and issue successful avoidance 
commands, but was often excessively noisy and infrequent. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
1. Chapter Overview 
Chapter V provides a discussion of the collision avoidance system’s development, 
application, and testing, as well as a “big picture” examination of current CA topics. 
Many aspects of this application and testing are specific to the available hardware and 
software, but considerations were always included throughout the design and evolution of 
the algorithm for other systems and missions. Military and civil applications were 
considered because, ultimately, the technologies related to this research will be far-
reaching. 
2. Conclusions of Research 
A collision avoidance algorithm was developed and successfully implemented in 
a multi-vehicle miniature unmanned aircraft system. This algorithm was conceived after 
an extensive literature review of current conflict detection and resolution theories and 
methods with an attempt to capture the benefits of those methods and apply them in a 
single algorithm. The detection portion of the algorithm, based on geometric methods, 
has inherent simplifications (i.e. nominal trajectory projections) that are more robustly 
addressed in other approaches (e.g. probabilistic methods) but are overcome by its 
simplistic application to many systems and threat environments. No pre- or post-
processing is required to represent the overall threat environment, and only tuning of 
navigation constants are required for different platforms. Novel developments include an 
approach to provide spatial awareness of all threats in a global sense to each vehicle in 
the cooperative system. Algorithm interfaces allow both cooperative and non-cooperative 
 
117 
inputs to be processed simultaneously and provide a truly global consideration of the 
environment only limited by sensing capability. The avoidance component of the 
algorithm is coupled with the detection algorithm to provide autonomous, continuous, 
and reactive commands to any collision encounter without a need for hard-coded threat 
prioritization or scripted maneuvers. Simple maneuver coordination logic is applied in the 
vertical dimension for the direction of the command. All other commands are completely 
autonomous and governed by the guidance law. 
Effects of uncertainties in the environment and the host-system are mitigated by 
defining separation volumes that are sufficiently large and by commanding maneuvers in 
multiple dimensions for separation. Multi-dimensional commands provide a layer of 
redundancy in that the algorithm is always trying to achieve two independent separation 
distances. If one fails, the other is still active. 
3. Significance of Research 
This research resulted in the first known flight tests of a multiple-vehicle, global, 
three-dimensional CA algorithm. Miniature unmanned aircraft were placed in dynamic, 
real-world encounters and responded to autonomously generated avoidance commands. 
The algorithm provides an autonomous CA capability for any encounter geometry and is 
not limited to any particular system or sensing capability. This algorithm evolves from 
contemporary and prevalent research areas focused on conflict detection and resolution, 
sense and avoid, and CA of manned aircraft, robotics, and unmanned technologies. 
Advantages of certain methods were exploited and an amenable approach was taken 
while addressing limitations. A mixture of theoretical fields were combined to develop 
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the final algorithm: robotics (e.g. collision cone approach), homing guidance (e.g. 
proportional navigation), and airspace management (e.g. separation criteria). The 
significance of the results is not just an assessment of the effectiveness of this particular 
algorithm, but the consideration of all aspects of deconflicting unmanned systems, i.e. 
sensing and measurement requirements, system integration, control commands and 
tracking, and necessary test procedures and equipment to evaluate the effectiveness. 
The ability to avoid obstacles and objects is of utmost concern for unmanned 
systems and the missions they are assigned. Weaponized unmanned aircraft will 
proliferate as technology advances and an alternative to endangering our warfighters 
becomes reliable and readily available. Their numbers and missions will expand and 
inevitably make a CA capability a system requirement. CA is already a requirement for 
any unmanned system requesting access to the NAS as stated in FAA regulations [35]. 
The specifics of this requirement are not defined and will not be defined for some time. 
As the author is writing this thesis, a bill has been introduced in the United States 
Congress with provisions for defining a timeline and requirements for unmanned system 
integration into the NAS [36]. The Federal Aviation Administration and the users 
requesting access to the NAS (Department of Defense, Department of Homeland 
Security, Customs and Border Protection, and Commercial and Private Users) are 
struggling to find a resolution between safety concerns and the desire for rapid 
integration and are willing to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to find a solution. CA 
is an integral part of unmanned system access to the NAS and a “sense and avoid” 
capability is arguably the most important, and unfortunately, ambiguous necessity for 
approval.  
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4. Recommendations for Action 
Bench test and flight test activities and results have revealed several items 
pertaining to the CA implementation, not the algorithm itself, which require immediate 
attention. Communication delay issues resulting from a build-up of commands due to 
processing limitations, not from a constant transmission delay, need to be addressed. This 
is a UAS-specific characteristic external to the algorithm that needs to be precisely 
located in the communication chain. Previous testing with the ANT laboratory BATCAM 
system experienced similar problems and an application-specific solution was 
implemented [37]. This solution involves pulsing commands so a build-up of 
communication packets does not occur. This is not compatible with a CA algorithm that 
sends more commands to more aircraft. Due to the small amount of time available to 
deconflict the aircraft in a collision encounter, any attempt to clear unprocessed packets 
from a buffer would only increase the collision potential. Quantization is another option 
to alleviate increasing delays in the communication channels. This would reduce the 
number of packets sent, but would result in larger commands being generated later in the 
encounter because of smaller resultant command responses in the beginning of the 
encounter. The proportional navigation guidance commands are proportional to the rate 
of change of the collision cone boundaries, which are small at larger ranges and 
continuously increase as the range decreases. If the commands do not continuously grow 
proportional to the bound rates and are quantized based on a pre-determined delta value, 
deconfliction will occur later in the encounter timeline with larger magnitudes of 
resultant commands. Dynamic delta values in the quantization may lessen this effect, but 
is out of scope of this thesis. 
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One possible improvement to the increasing communication delay is aggregating 
the three commands for each aircraft into a single packet, thereby, reducing the number 
of packets sent. The current interface between the CA algorithm and the autopilot does 
not support this. Commands are currently sent separately to each BATCAM in a 
sequential manner. Action should be taken to determine if the Kestrel autopilot 
communication interfaces support this modification. It should also be determined whether 
or not the Kestrel autopilot and Virtual Cockpit GCS support separate communication 
links for telemetry and control packets. This would divide the two-way communication 
traffic and possibly hasten transmissions. 
The small angle of attack assumption and the assumption that the dynamic delay 
between pitch changes and altitude changes were proven to be inaccurate in flight tests 
with environmental uncertainty. These assumptions were applied in order to convert the 
algorithm flight path angular rate command to the available Kestrel pitch command. The 
most current version of the Kestrel autopilot includes a climb rate command that can be 
more directly calculated from flight path rate commands. Regrettably, the reason turn rate 
command recording was not available is because turn rate commands may not be 
available in that same version of the autopilot as explained in discussions with Procerus 
engineers. It seems compatibility between all desired commands cannot be acquired 
simultaneously. This is an unfortunate side-effect of an evolving autopilot design and the 
users’ attempt to develop their own applications.   
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5. Recommendations for Future Research 
In any system with uncertainty, either inherent in the system or as a result of 
external inputs, there is no guarantee of desired results; there is only a probability that 
they will be achieved successfully. This applies to CA and the efforts to maintain 
minimum separation. The likelihood that this thesis’ CA system will deconflict aircraft 
and maintain minimum separation could be quantitatively determined in Monte Carlo 
simulations prior to additional flight tests and implementation into more systems. 
Parametric studies should be completed to determine, based on the probabilities from 
each Monte Carlo run, what separation volume lateral and vertical distances would result 
in the highest likelihood of maintaining separation within some constraints. An 
independent variable in these studies is the required probability of maintaining 
separation. Depending on the system, the mission, and the user, should the separation be 
maintained 90%, 95% or 99% of the time? For inexpensive, expendable systems, a 
simple, less reliable CA system may be desired. For a complex, expensive system such as 
a Global Hawk UAS, an accurate and dependable CA system will be required.  
Furthermore, in cases where separation is lost, what is the probability that the 
aircraft will actually collide? These statistics can be gleaned from the same Monte Carlo 
runs as for loss of separation studies, but more iterations may be required to have a 
statistically sufficient amount of encounters. These types of studies could be performed 
for a variety of algorithms or algorithm variations. Analyses such as these will be 
required by the FAA for candidate sense and avoid systems prior to unmanned system 
integration into the NAS. 
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The algorithm developed in this research was intentionally constructed in a 
generic manner for compatibility with many systems. However, when applied to a 
specific system, certain aspects of the algorithm can be tailored for enhanced 
performance. The most obvious variables were discussed in this thesis: the separation 
volume, the maximum CA range, and the proportional navigation constants. Further 
modifications could be made for increased probability of maintaining separation. For 
example, all commands in three dimensions are applied for every collision encounter. It 
may be determined in simulations or flight test that particular encounter geometries 
require only one type of command or require more benign commands. A command 
selection algorithm could be designed with this information and energy savings or less 
impact on the UAS mission could be achieved. Adaptive proportional gains could be 
derived that result in an optimal avoidance maneuver. Techniques such as these have 
been researched, and were discussed in Chapter II, but not for an algorithm such as this, 
i.e. global, three-dimensional, and depending on the optimality condition, cooperative. 
The effectiveness of any modification will depend on the aircraft and the threats it will 
encounter. 
This algorithm relied on the Kestrel autopilot navigation mode to return the 
aircraft to waypoint following and their planned routes. Optimal trajectory generation 
could be used to return the aircraft to the planned routes before navigation mode is once 
again enabled. This would result in a CA and recovery algorithm that would both 
deconflict and restore the aircraft with minimal deviation from their original paths. 
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6. Summary 
Fundamental theory was examined and further developed for application to the 
collision avoidance problem in this thesis, and an algorithm was designed, coded, and 
tested in ideal simulations. Application to an unmanned aircraft system, including 
algorithm development, user and system interface construction, and software-in-the-loop 
and hardware-in-the-loop testing was completed to validate the approach. Flight tests 
were conducted to assess the algorithm and system’s performance in the presence of 
operational and environmental uncertainty. The results of all of the above efforts and 
events were discussed in detail along with high level discussions about current issues 
related to the collision avoidance topic.  
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Appendix A:  Collision Avoidance Algorithm/Virtual Cockpit Interface 
 
Inputs: 
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a
V
P
γ
ψ
γ
ψ

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
 where i indicates the ith UAS 










=
i
UAS
i
UAS
i
UAS
i
UAS
Z
Y
X
P

 = UAS Local-Level Referenced Position (can be derived from GPS 
Latitude, Longitude, and Altitude) 
 
i
UASV  = UAS Speed (preferably groundspeed from GPS, airspeed only if groundspeed not 
available) 
 
i
UASψ  = UAS Ground Track (from GPS, heading is only acceptable if winds are accounted 
for) 
 
i
UASγ  = UAS Vertical Flight Path Angle (FPA) (can be derived, preferably, from velocity 
components, or assumed to equal, cautiously, aircraft pitch angle for small angle of 
attack) 
 
i
UASa  = UAS Translational Acceleration (can be assumed equal to the body X-axis 
acceleration for small angle of attack) 
 
i
UASψ  = UAS Turn Rate 
i
UASγ  = UAS Rate of Change of Vertical Flight Path Angle (can be derived from climb 
acceleration, or from both γ and body Z-axis acceleration) 
 
 
125 
Table A-1:  Algorithm to Kestrel Autopilot Variable Matrix, Virtual Cockpit 2.4 
 ICD Kestrel 
  Label Variable Name 
Position 
X F15 (F13) GPS East Pos 
Estimate (Measured) 
Y F16 (F14) GPS North Pos 
Estimate (Measured) 
Z F20 GPS Altitude 
Speed V F18 (F17) Ground Speed 
Estimate (Measured) 
Ground Track Ψ F19 (F7) GPS Heading 
(Filtered) 
Vertical FPA γ (F2) (Theta) 
Acceleration a F52 Ax (accelerometer) 
Turn Rate ψdot F33 Heading Rate 
Rate of Change of FPA1 γdot F54 and F18 (F17) Az and Speed 
 
Values in parentheses are alternates. 
 
1. Assumption: 
V
Az−≈γ  
 
Table A-2:  Algorithm to Kestrel Autopilot Packet Variable Matrix, Virtual Cockpit 
2.4 
ICD Kestrel Communications 
Name  Packet Index Variable Name Units 
Position 
X 248 14 GPS Lon deg 
248 22 GPS Lon home deg 
Y 248 8 GPS Lat deg 
248 18 GPS Lat home deg 
Z 248 2 GPS Alt (m+1000)*6 
Speed V 248 0 GPS Velocity (m/s+10)*20 
Ground Track ψ 248 4 GPS Heading rad*1000 
Vertical FPA 






= −
V
h1sinγ  
249 76 Actual Climb Rate m/s*300 
Acceleration a 18 40 Ax m/s^2*1000 
Turn Rate ψdot 249 10 Heading Rate rad/s*1000 
Rate of 
Change of 
FPA1 
V
Az−≈γ  
18 44 Az m/s^2*1000 
1. Assumes Z-axis is down 
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Conversions: 
 
X = (Lon - Lon Home) * dLon2m [Lon in deg] 
Y = (Lat - Lat Home) * dLat2m [Lat in deg] 
 
aLat = (Lat + Lat Home)/2 
dLon2m = 111415.13*cos(aLat) – 94.55*cos(3*aLat) 
dLat2m = 111132.09 – 566.05*cos(2*aLat) + 1.2*cos(4*aLat) 
 
Outputs: 
 
Algorithm: 
 










com
com
com
a
γ
ψ


 = turn rate command, rate of change of vertical FPA command, acceleration 
command 
 
Kestrel Autopilot: 
 
1. Desired Turn Rate 
2. Desired Pitch Angle 
3. Desired Airspeed 
 










+
+=










dtaV
dt
V comdes
comdes
com
des
des
des
γθ
ψ
θ
ψ


 where small angle of attack is assumed, and dt is the time step 
between command transmittals ***must be set according to command transmissions*** 
 
Table A-3:  Algorithm to Kestrel Autopilot Command Packet Matrix, Virtual 
Cockpit 2.4 
Set Desired Value (Packet 231) Kestrel Communications (Section 3.58) 
Command Byte Index Variable Name Units 
desψ  27 Desired turn rate rad/s 
desθ  7 Desired pitch rad 
desV  23 Desired airspeed m/s 
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Appendix B:  Collision Cone Boundary Rates 
The following definitions and nomenclature are repeated here for convenience from [7] 
and [27]. The variables  and are the rates of change of the collision cone boundaries 
with respect to the line of sight. 
 
N21, Case 1: 
 
][21 null==ηη   
 
N21, Case 2: 
 
( ) ( ) ζν
νζη
νζη
η 


 −+−
+
= 1
1
1 tancos
A
 
( ) ( ) ζν
νζηπ
νζηπ
η 


 −−−+
−−
−
= 2
2
2 tancos
A  
 
N21, Case 3: 
 
211 case
ηη  =  
( ) ( ) ζν
νζηπ
νζηπ
η 


 −−−−+
−−−
−
= 2
2
2 tancos
A  
 
N21, Case 4: 
 
021 ==ηη   
 
N22, Case 1: 
 
][~~ 21 null==ηη   
 
N22, Case 2: 
 
( ) ( ) ζν
νζη
νζη
η 



~~~tan~~cos
~
~
1
1
1 −+−+
=
A  
( ) ( ) ζν
νζηπ
νζηπ
η 



~~~tan~~cos
~
~
2
2
2 −−−+−−
−
=
A  
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N22, Case 3: 
 
211
~~
case
ηη  =  
( ) ( ) ζν
νζηπ
νζηπ
η 



~~~tan~~cos
~
~
2
2
2 −−−−+−−−
−
=
A  
 
N22, Case 4: 
 
0~~ 21 ==ηη   
 
where  
 
θβµ −=−= ;22 RrRp  
INT
UAS
V
V
p
p
p
pA =








+
=
+
+
= − νζµµ ;
1
sin;
1
sincos
2
1
2
 
ζπζµµ −=
+
−
=
~;
1
sincos~
2p
pA  
( ) ( )µµζµζµζ sincoscossincoscos pApA −+−=   
( ) ( )µµζµµζζ sincos~coscos~sin~~cos~ pApA ++−=   
ζζ 2cosp =  
ζζ  −=~  
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Appendix C:  Ideal Simulation Plots 
 
Figure C-1:  Ideal Approaching Simulation Trajectories, CPA at 32.9 s 
 
 
Figure C-2:  Ideal Approaching Simulation Avoidance Algorithm Commands 
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Figure C-3:  Ideal Approaching Simulation Kestrel Commands 
 
 
Figure C-4:  Ideal Approaching Simulation Range 
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Figure C-5:  Ideal Approaching Simulation Altitude 
 
 
Figure C-6:  Ideal Abeam Simulation Trajectories, CPA at 23.4 s 
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Figure C-7:  Ideal Abeam Simulation Avoidance Algorithm Commands 
 
Figure C-8:  Ideal Abeam Simulation Kestrel Commands 
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Figure C-9:  Ideal Abeam Simulation Range 
 
Figure C-10:  Ideal Abeam Simulation Altitude 
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Figure C-11:  Ideal Converging Simulation Trajectories, CPA at 55 s 
 
Figure C-12:  Ideal Converging Simulation Avoidance Algorithm Commands 
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Figure C-13:  Ideal Converging Simulation Kestrel Commands 
 
Figure C-14:  Ideal Converging Simulation Range 
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Figure C-15:  Ideal Converging Simulation Altitude 
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Appendix D:  SIL Simulation Plots 
 
Figure D-1:  SIL Approaching Simulation Trajectories 
 
Figure D-2:  SIL Approaching Simulation Airspeed 
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Figure D-3:  SIL Approaching Simulation Turn Rate 
 
Figure D-4:  SIL Approaching Simulation Pitch 
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Figure D-5:  SIL Approaching Simulation Range 
 
Figure D-6:  SIL Approaching Simulation Altitude 
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Figure D-7:  SIL Abeam Simulation Trajectories 
 
Figure D-8:  SIL Abeam Simulation Airspeed 
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Figure D-9:  SIL Abeam Simulation Turn Rate 
 
Figure D-10:  SIL Abeam Simulation Pitch 
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Figure D-11:  SIL Abeam Simulation Range 
 
Figure D-12:  SIL Abeam Simulation Altitude 
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Figure D-13:  SIL Converging Simulation Trajectories 
 
Figure D-14:  SIL Converging Simulation Airspeed 
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Figure D-15:  SIL Converging Simulation Turn Rate 
 
Figure D-16:  SIL Converging Simulation Pitch 
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Figure D-17:  SIL Converging Simulation Range 
 
Figure D-18:  SIL Converging Simulation Altitude 
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Appendix E:  HIL Simulation Plots 
 
Figure E-1:  HIL Approaching Simulation Trajectories 
 
Figure E-2:  HIL Approaching Simulation Airspeed Avoidance Command 
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Figure E-3:  HIL Approaching Simulation Turn Rate Avoidance Command 
 
Figure E-4:  HIL Approaching Simulation Pitch Avoidance Command 
560 565 570 575 580 585 590 595 600
-2
-1
0
1
2
UAV1
Tu
rn
 R
at
e,
 d
eg
/s
 
 
Man
Nav
M
od
e
Actual
Des
Mode
560 565 570 575 580 585 590 595 600
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
UAV2
t, s
Tu
rn
 R
at
e,
 d
eg
/s
 
 
Man
Nav
M
od
e
Actual
Des
Mode
560 565 570 575 580 585 590 595 600
-10
-7.5
-5
-2.5
0
2.5
5
UAV1
P
itc
h,
 d
eg
 
 
Man
Nav
M
od
e
Actual
Des
Mode
560 565 570 575 580 585 590 595 600
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
UAV2
t, s
P
itc
h,
 d
eg
 
 
Man
Nav
M
od
e
Actual
Des
Mode
 
148 
 
 
Figure E-5:  HIL Approaching Simulation Range 
 
Figure E-6:  HIL Approaching Simulation Altitude 
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Figure E-7:  HIL Abeam Simulation Trajectories 
 
 
Figure E-8:  HIL Abeam Simulation Airspeed Avoidance Command 
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Figure E-9:  HIL Abeam Simulation Turn Rate Avoidance Command 
 
Figure E-10:  HIL Abeam Simulation Pitch Avoidance Command 
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Figure E-11:  HIL Abeam Simulation Range 
 
Figure E-12:  HIL Abeam Simulation Altitude 
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Figure E-13:  HIL Converging Simulation Trajectories 
 
Figure E-14:  HIL Converging Simulation Airspeed Avoidance Command 
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Figure E-15:  HIL Converging Simulation Turn Rate Avoidance Command 
 
Figure E-16:  HIL Converging Simulation Pitch Avoidance Command 
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Figure E-17:  HIL Converging Simulation Range 
 
Figure E-18:  HIL Converging Simulation Altitude 
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Appendix F:  Flight Test Plots 
 
Figure F-1:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 1 Trajectories 
 
Figure F-2:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 1 Airspeed Response 
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Figure F-3:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 1 Turn Rate Response 
 
Figure F-4:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 1 Pitch Response 
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Figure F-5:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 1 Range 
 
Figure F-6:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 1 Altitude 
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Figure F-7:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 3 Trajectories 
 
Figure F-8:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 3 Airspeed Response 
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Figure F-9:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 3 Turn Rate Response 
 
Figure F-10:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 3 Pitch Response 
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Figure F-11:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 3 Range 
 
Figure F-12:  Flight Test Head-on Encounter 3 Altitude 
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Figure F-13:  Flight Test Approaching Encounter 1 Trajectories 
 
Figure F-14:  Flight Test Approaching Encounter 1 Airspeed Response 
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Figure F-15:  Flight Test Approaching Encounter 1 Turn Rate Response 
 
Figure F-16:  Flight Test Approaching Encounter 1 Pitch Response 
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Figure F-17:  Flight Test Approaching Encounter 1 Range 
 
Figure F-18:  Flight Test Approaching Encounter 1 Altitude  
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Appendix G:  Flight Test Procedures 
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Appendix H:  Collision Avoidance Algorithm MATLAB Code 
MULT_UAS_AA 
function [alphadotc gammadotc vdotc pdcKOUT tcKOUT vcKOUT... 
    r rh rv rdot conflict cflct_array cflct_arrayv] =... 
    
mult_uas_aa(Rl,VO,DMAX,dt,V_ALL,x_ALL,y_ALL,z_ALL,alpha_ALL,gamma_ALL,.
.. 
    vdot_ALL,alphadot_ALL,gammadot_ALL,varargin) 
  
persistent violation evasion evasionv flag flagv 
persistent pdcK tcK vcK 
  
Nuas=length(V_ALL); 
if Nuas<=1, 
    alphadotc=0; %alphadot_ALL; 
    gammadotc=0; %gammadot_ALL; 
    vdotc=0; %vdot_ALL; 
    pdcKOUT=0; %-alphadot_ALL; 
    tcKOUT=0; %gamma_ALL; 
    vcKOUT=0; %V_ALL; 
    r=0.0; 
    rh=0.0; 
    rv=0.0; 
    rdot=0.0; 
    conflict=0.0; 
    cflct_array=0.0; 
    cflct_arrayv=0.0; 
    return; 
else 
    % Pre-allocate some outputs 
    conflict=zeros(1,Nuas); 
    pdcKOUT=zeros(1,Nuas); 
    tcKOUT=zeros(1,Nuas); 
    vcKOUT=zeros(1,Nuas); 
    vdotc=zeros(1,Nuas); 
    gammadotc=zeros(1,Nuas); 
    alphadotc=zeros(1,Nuas); 
end 
  
if isempty(varargin), 
    Nnoncoop=0; 
else 
    Nnoncoop=length(varargin{1}); 
end 
  
if isempty(violation), 
    violation=zeros(1,Nuas); 
    evasion=zeros(1,Nuas); 
    evasionv=zeros(1,Nuas); 
    flag=zeros(1,Nuas); 
    flagv=zeros(1,Nuas); 
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elseif length(violation)<Nuas, 
    dim_viol=length(violation); 
    dim_addv=Nuas-dim_viol; 
    violation=[violation zeros(1,dim_addv)]; 
    evasion=[evasion zeros(1,dim_addv)]; 
    evasionv=[evasionv zeros(1,dim_addv)]; 
    flag=[flag zeros(1,dim_addv)]; 
    flagv=[flagv zeros(1,dim_addv)]; 
end 
  
if isempty(pdcK), 
    pdcK=-alphadot_ALL; 
    tcK=gamma_ALL; 
    vcK=V_ALL; 
elseif length(pdcK)<Nuas, 
    dim_pdcK=length(pdcK); 
    dim_add=Nuas-dim_pdcK; 
    pdcK=[pdcK' zeros(1,dim_add)]'; 
    tcK=[tcK' gamma_ALL(dim_pdcK+1:end).*ones(1,dim_add)]'; 
    vcK=[vcK' V_ALL(dim_pdcK+1:end).*ones(1,dim_add)]'; 
end 
  
if Nnoncoop>0, 
    V_F_non=varargin{1}; 
    x_F_non=varargin{2}; 
    y_F_non=varargin{3}; 
    z_F_non=varargin{4}; 
    beta_non=varargin{5}; 
    chi_non=varargin{6}; 
    vfdot_non=varargin{7}; 
    betadot_non=varargin{8}; 
    chidot_non=varargin{9}; 
else 
    V_F_non=[]; 
    x_F_non=[]; 
    y_F_non=[]; 
    z_F_non=[]; 
    beta_non=[]; 
    chi_non=[]; 
    vfdot_non=[]; 
    betadot_non=[]; 
    chidot_non=[]; 
end 
  
for jj=1:Nuas, 
  
    V_O=V_ALL(jj); 
    x_O=x_ALL(jj); 
    y_O=y_ALL(jj); 
    z_O=z_ALL(jj); 
    alpha=alpha_ALL(jj); 
    gamma=gamma_ALL(jj); 
    vdot=vdot_ALL(jj); 
    if jj==1, 
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        indexF=jj+1:Nuas; 
    elseif jj==Nuas, 
        indexF=1:Nuas-1; 
    else 
        indexF=[1:jj-1 jj+1:Nuas]; 
    end 
    indexFall=[indexF -1:-1:-length(V_F_non)]; 
    V_F=[V_ALL(indexF);V_F_non]; 
    x_F=[x_ALL(indexF);x_F_non]; 
    y_F=[y_ALL(indexF);y_F_non]; 
    z_F=[z_ALL(indexF);z_F_non]; 
    beta=[alpha_ALL(indexF);beta_non]; 
    chi=[gamma_ALL(indexF);chi_non]; 
    vfdot=[vdot_ALL(indexF);vfdot_non]; 
    betadot=[alphadot_ALL(indexF);betadot_non]; 
    chidot=[gammadot_ALL(indexF);chidot_non]; 
     
    %Calculate velocity components 
    Vx_O = V_O*cos(alpha)*cos(gamma); 
    Vy_O = V_O*sin(alpha)*cos(gamma); 
    Vz_O = V_O*sin(gamma); 
    Vx_F = V_F.*cos(beta).*cos(chi); 
    Vy_F = V_F.*sin(beta).*cos(chi); 
    Vz_F = V_F.*sin(chi); 
  
    % Range 
    r(1+(jj-1)*(Nuas-1+Nnoncoop):jj*(Nuas-1+Nnoncoop))    = sqrt((z_F-
z_O).^2+(y_F-y_O).^2+(x_F-x_O).^2); 
    rdot(1+(jj-1)*(Nuas-1+Nnoncoop):jj*(Nuas-1+Nnoncoop)) = ((Vy_F-
Vy_O).*(y_F-y_O)+(Vx_F-Vx_O).*(x_F-x_O)+(Vz_F-Vz_O).*(z_F-z_O))./... 
        sqrt((z_F-z_O).^2+(y_F-y_O).^2+(x_F-x_O).^2); 
    rh(1+(jj-1)*(Nuas-1+Nnoncoop):jj*(Nuas-1+Nnoncoop))   = sqrt((y_F-
y_O).^2+(x_F-x_O).^2); 
    rv(1+(jj-1)*(Nuas-1+Nnoncoop):jj*(Nuas-1+Nnoncoop))   = sqrt((z_F-
z_O).^2); 
  
    % Define Intruder Inputs for ones in Sensor Volume 
    x_F_in=x_F; 
    y_F_in=y_F; 
    z_F_in=z_F; 
    V_F_in=V_F; 
    vfdot_in=vfdot; 
    beta_in=beta; 
    chi_in=chi; 
    betadot_in=betadot; 
    chidot_in=chidot; 
  
    %Reset CCAA flags 
    Fv=violation(jj); 
    Fe=evasion(jj); 
    Fev=evasionv(jj); 
    Ff=flag(jj); 
    Ffv=flagv(jj); 
    Fsv=zeros(1,Nuas-1+Nnoncoop); 
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    %Process inputs 
    psiO=-alpha+pi/2; 
    psiF=-beta_in+pi/2; 
    gammaO=gamma; 
    gammaF=chi_in; 
    psidF=-betadot_in; 
    gammadF=chidot_in; 
  
    %Call CCAA 
    [psidotc gamdotc acc violation(jj) evasion(jj) evasionv(jj) 
flag(jj) flagv(jj) sensvol(jj,:)... 
        conflict(jj) cflct_int cflct_intv]=... 
        cc_pn_aa(x_O,y_O,z_O,V_O,vdot,psiO,gammaO,... 
        x_F_in,y_F_in,z_F_in,V_F_in,vfdot_in,psiF,... 
        gammaF,psidF,gammadF,Rl,VO,Fv,Fe,Fev,Ff,Ffv,Fsv); 
  
    seeint=1:Nuas-1+Nnoncoop; 
    cflct_see_int=[];cflct_true_int=[]; 
    cflct_see_intv=[];cflct_true_intv=[]; 
    %Determine conflict properties, if any 
    if ~isempty(cflct_int), 
        cflct_see_int=seeint(cflct_int); 
        cflct_true_int=indexFall(cflct_see_int); 
    end 
    if ~isempty(cflct_intv), 
        cflct_see_intv=seeint(cflct_intv); 
        cflct_true_intv=indexFall(cflct_see_intv); 
    end 
    cflct_array(1+(jj-1)*(Nuas-1+Nnoncoop):jj*(Nuas-
1+Nnoncoop))=[cflct_true_int';zeros(Nuas-1+Nnoncoop-
length(cflct_true_int),1)]; 
    cflct_arrayv(1+(jj-1)*(Nuas-1+Nnoncoop):jj*(Nuas-
1+Nnoncoop))=[cflct_true_intv';zeros(Nuas-1+Nnoncoop-
length(cflct_true_intv),1)]; 
  
    %Process outputs 
    alphadotc_=-psidotc; 
    gammadotc_=gamdotc; 
    vdotc_=acc; 
  
    vdotc(jj)=vdotc_; 
    gammadotc(jj)=gammadotc_; 
    alphadotc(jj)=alphadotc_; 
  
    %Kestrel Commands 
    if conflict(jj)>=1, 
        pdcK(jj)=-alphadotc(jj); 
        tcK(jj)=tcK(jj)+gammadotc(jj)*dt; 
        vcK(jj)=vcK(jj)+vdotc(jj)*dt; 
        %Range Check 
        csum=0; 
        for uu=1+(jj-1)*(Nuas-1):jj*(Nuas-1), 
            r_uu=r(uu); 
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            if ((cflct_array(uu)~=0) && (cflct_arrayv(uu)~=0) && 
r_uu<DMAX); 
                csum=1; 
                break; 
            end 
        end 
        if csum==0, 
            conflict(jj)=0; 
            vdotc(jj)=0; 
            alphadotc(jj)=0; 
            gammadotc(jj)=0; 
            vcK(jj)=V_ALL(jj); 
            pdcK(jj)=-alphadotc(jj); 
            tcK(jj)=gamma_ALL(jj); 
            violation(jj)=0; 
            evasion(jj)=0; 
            evasionv(jj)=0; 
            flag(jj)=0; 
            flagv(jj)=0; 
        end 
    else 
        pdcK(jj)=-alphadotc(jj); 
        tcK(jj)=gamma_ALL(jj); 
        vcK(jj)=V_ALL(jj); 
    end 
  
end 
  
%Coordinate Commands 
cflct_idx=find(conflict>=1); 
cflct_idx_len=length(cflct_idx); 
if cflct_idx_len>1, 
    for jj=1:cflct_idx_len-1, 
        primary=cflct_idx(jj); 
        others=cflct_idx(jj+1:end); 
        for kk=1:length(others), 
            if sign(gammadotc(primary))==sign(gammadotc(others(kk))), 
                gammadotc(others(kk))=-gammadotc(others(kk)); 
                
tcK(others(kk))=tcK(others(kk))+2*gammadotc(others(kk))*dt; 
            end 
        end 
    end 
end 
  
pdcKOUT=pdcK; 
tcKOUT=tcK; 
vcKOUT=vcK; 
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CC_PN_AA 
function [psidotc gamdotc acc violation evasion evasionv flag flagv 
sensvol... 
    conflict cflct_int cflct_intv]=... 
    
cc_pn_aa(x_O,y_O,z_O,V_O,vdot,psiO,gammaO,x_F,y_F,z_F,V_F,vfdot,psiF,..
. 
    gammaF,psidF,gammadF,Rl,VO,Fv,Fe,Fev,Ff,Ffv,Fsv) 
  
%Minimum Separation Parameters 
R=Rl; 
Hv=VO; 
  
%Determine number if intruders 
Ni=length(x_F); 
  
%Convert aircraft parameters to Collision Cone parameters 
alpha=wrap_mpi2pi(-psiO+pi/2); 
beta(:,1)=wrap_mpi2pi(-psiF+pi/2); 
gamma=wrap_mpi2pi(gammaO); 
chi(:,1)=wrap_mpi2pi(gammaF); 
  
betadot=-psidF; 
chidot=gammadF; 
  
%Calculate velocity components 
Vx_O = V_O*cos(alpha)*cos(gamma); 
Vy_O = V_O*sin(alpha)*cos(gamma); 
Vz_O = V_O*sin(gamma); 
Vx_F = V_F.*cos(beta).*cos(chi); 
Vy_F = V_F.*sin(beta).*cos(chi); 
Vz_F = V_F.*sin(chi); 
  
%Initialize Flags 
violation = Fv; 
evasion = Fe; 
evasionv = Fev; 
flag = Ff; 
flagv = Ffv; 
sensvol = Fsv; 
  
%Calculate necessary parameters 
% range 
r = sqrt((z_F-z_O).^2+(y_F-y_O).^2+(x_F-x_O).^2); 
rh = sqrt((y_F-y_O).^2+(x_F-x_O).^2); 
% line of sight angle 
th=atan2(y_F-y_O,x_F-x_O); 
phii_=atan2(z_F-z_O,cos(th).*(x_F-x_O)+sin(th).*(y_F-y_O)); 
phii=atan2(z_F-z_O,cos(alpha).*(x_F-x_O)+sin(alpha).*(y_F-y_O)); 
% relative velocity along LOS 
vri=V_F.*cos(beta-th).*cos(chi-phii_)-V_O.*cos(alpha-th).*cos(gamma-
phii_); 
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% relative velocity perp to LOS 
vthi=V_F.*sin(beta-th).*cos(chi-phii_)-V_O.*sin(alpha-th).*cos(gamma-
phii_); 
vphi=V_F.*sin(chi-phii_)-V_O.*sin(gamma-phii_); 
% relative velocity magnitude 
vrel = sqrt((V_O*cos(alpha)*cos(gamma)-V_F.*cos(beta).*cos(chi)).^2+... 
    (V_O*sin(alpha)*cos(gamma)-V_F.*sin(beta).*cos(chi)).^2+... 
    (V_O*sin(gamma)-V_F.*sin(chi)).^2); 
% relative heading 
psirel = atan2((V_O*sin(alpha)-V_F.*sin(beta)),(V_O*cos(alpha)-
V_F.*cos(beta))); 
phirel = atan2((V_O*sin(gamma)-V_F.*sin(chi)),(V_O*cos(gamma)-
V_F.*cos(chi))); 
% Relative azimuth and elevation calculations 
xrfeh = cos(alpha)*(x_F-x_O)+sin(alpha)*(y_F-y_O); 
yrfeh = -sin(alpha)*(x_F-x_O)+cos(alpha)*(y_F-y_O); 
relaz = atan2(-yrfeh,xrfeh); 
rrfev = sqrt(xrfeh.^2+yrfeh.^2)*cos(gamma)+(z_F-z_O)*sin(gamma); 
zrfev = -sqrt(xrfeh.^2+yrfeh.^2)*sin(gamma)+(z_F-z_O)*cos(gamma); 
relel = atan2(zrfev,rrfev); 
  
%Vertical collision circle calculations 
% vertical line of sights to hockey-puck corners 
rRv=sqrt((z_F-z_O).^2+(cos(alpha).*(x_F-x_O)+sin(alpha).*(y_F-
y_O)).^2); 
for oo = 1:Ni, 
    if (z_F(oo)-z_O) >= (Hv), 
        philow(oo) = atan2(rRv(oo).*sin(phii(oo))-
(Hv),rRv(oo).*cos(phii(oo))+R); 
        phihig(oo) = 
atan2(rRv(oo).*sin(phii(oo))+(Hv),rRv(oo).*cos(phii(oo))-R); 
    elseif (z_F(oo)-z_O) < (Hv) && (z_F(oo)-z_O) > -(Hv), 
        philow(oo) = atan2(rRv(oo).*sin(phii(oo))-
(Hv),rRv(oo).*cos(phii(oo))-R); 
        phihig(oo) = 
atan2(rRv(oo).*sin(phii(oo))+(Hv),rRv(oo).*cos(phii(oo))-R); 
    else 
        philow(oo) = atan2(rRv(oo).*sin(phii(oo))-
(Hv),rRv(oo).*cos(phii(oo))-R); 
        phihig(oo) = 
atan2(rRv(oo).*sin(phii(oo))+(Hv),rRv(oo).*cos(phii(oo))+R); 
    end 
end 
psiv = phihig-philow; 
Rv = rRv.*sin(psiv'/2); 
% center of vertical circle 
x_ccv = rRv.*abs(cos(philow' + psiv'/2)).*cos(alpha).*sign(xrfeh); %ALS 
- ABS value function 
y_ccv = rRv.*abs(cos(philow' + psiv'/2)).*sin(alpha).*sign(xrfeh); %ALS 
- ABS value function 
z_ccv = rRv.*sin(philow' + psiv'/2); 
% LOS and relative velocities to vertical circle 
phic_=atan2(z_ccv,cos(th).*(x_ccv)+sin(th).*(y_ccv)); 
phic=atan2(z_ccv,cos(alpha).*(x_ccv)+sin(alpha).*(y_ccv)); 
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vrc=V_F.*cos(beta-alpha).*cos(chi-phic)-V_O.*cos(alpha-
alpha).*cos(gamma-phic); 
vthc=V_F.*sin(beta-alpha).*cos(chi-phic)-V_O.*sin(alpha-
alpha).*cos(gamma-phic); 
vphc=V_F.*sin(chi-phic)-V_O.*sin(gamma-phic); 
% rate of change of collision avoidance vector angle 
gam = asin(R./rh); 
thdot = ((Vy_F-Vy_O).*(x_F-x_O)-(Vx_F-Vx_O).*(y_F-y_O))./... 
    ((x_F-x_O).^2+(y_F-y_O).^2); 
gamv = asin(Rv./rRv); 
phi = phic; 
h_Phi = sqrt((x_F-x_O).^2+(y_F-y_O).^2); 
Vh_Phi = sqrt((Vx_F-Vx_O).^2+(Vy_F-Vy_O).^2); 
pdden = (h_Phi.^2+(z_F-z_O).^2); 
for pd_i=1:length(pdden), 
    pdden(pd_i)=max([1e-6 pdden(pd_i)]); 
end 
phidot = ((Vz_F-Vz_O).*h_Phi-Vh_Phi.*(z_F-z_O))./pdden; 
  
%Collision Cone parameters 
mu = beta - th; 
nu = (V_O*cos(gamma))./(V_F.*cos(chi)); 
p = R./sqrt(rh.^2-R^2); 
%muv = chi - phi; 
for kl=1:Ni, 
    if sign(xrfeh(kl))>0 && cos(alpha-beta(kl))<0, 
        muv(kl) = (pi-chi(kl)) - phi(kl); 
    else 
        muv(kl) = chi(kl) - phi(kl); 
    end 
end 
nuv = (V_O)./(V_F.*abs(cos(beta-alpha))); %ALS - ABS value function 
pv = Rv./sqrt(rRv.^2-Rv.^2); 
  
pdot = vri.*(-p.^3.*rh/(R^2)); 
mudot = betadot-thdot; 
pdotv = vrc.*(-pv.^3.*rRv./(Rv.^2)); 
mudotv = chidot-phidot; 
nudot = (vdot*cos(gamma))./(V_F.*cos(chi)) - nu.*vfdot./V_F; %ALS 
nudotv = vdot./(V_F.*abs(cos(beta-alpha))) - nuv.*vfdot./V_F; %ALS 
  
%Collision Check 
% initialize cone variables as empty 
acount=[]; 
alpha_up=[];alpha_dn=[];alpha_up_dot=[];alpha_dn_dot=[]; 
acountv=[]; 
alpha_upv=[];alpha_dnv=[];alpha_up_dotv=[];alpha_dn_dotv=[]; 
% check each Intruder 
for kk = 1:Ni, 
    %Check for intruder in sensor volume 
    %Check for miss distance violation 
    violation1=zeros(1,Ni); 
    if r(kk) <= R && z_O>z_F(kk)-Hv && z_O<z_F(kk)+Hv, 
        violation1(kk) = 1; 
        alpha_up=[];alpha_dn=[];alpha_up_dot=[];alpha_dn_dot=[]; 
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        alpha_upv=[];alpha_dnv=[];alpha_up_dotv=[];alpha_dn_dotv=[]; 
        break; 
    elseif violation == 1, 
        alpha_up=[];alpha_dn=[];alpha_up_dot=[];alpha_dn_dot=[]; 
        alpha_upv=[];alpha_dnv=[];alpha_up_dotv=[];alpha_dn_dotv=[]; 
        break; 
    else 
        %Call Collision Cone 
        [eta_up,eta_dn,eta_up_dot,eta_dn_dot] = 
f_collisioncone4(mu(kk),nu(kk),p(kk),mudot(kk),nudot(kk),pdot(kk)); 
        [eta_upv,eta_dnv,eta_up_dotv,eta_dn_dotv] = 
f_collisioncone4(muv(kk),nuv(kk),pv(kk),mudotv(kk),nudotv(kk),pdotv(kk)
); 
        %Dispose of invalid cones 
        deta=abs(eta_up-eta_dn); 
        detav=abs(eta_upv-eta_dnv); 
        ide=find(deta>1e-4 & deta<2*pi-1e-4); 
        idev=find(detav>1e-4 & detav<2*pi-1e-4); 
        eta_up=eta_up(ide); 
        eta_up_dot=eta_up_dot(ide); 
        eta_dn=eta_dn(ide); 
        eta_dn_dot=eta_dn_dot(ide); 
        eta_upv=eta_upv(idev); 
        eta_up_dotv=eta_up_dotv(idev); 
        eta_dnv=eta_dnv(idev); 
        eta_dn_dotv=eta_dn_dotv(idev); 
        %Define Angular Limits of cones 
        alpha_up = [alpha_up; eta_up' + th(kk)]; 
        alpha_dn = [alpha_dn; eta_dn' + th(kk)]; 
        alpha_up_dot = [alpha_up_dot; eta_up_dot' + thdot(kk)]; 
        alpha_dn_dot = [alpha_dn_dot; eta_dn_dot' + thdot(kk)]; 
  
        alpha_upv = [alpha_upv; eta_upv' + phi(kk)]; 
        alpha_dnv = [alpha_dnv; eta_dnv' + phi(kk)]; 
        alpha_up_dotv = [alpha_up_dotv; eta_up_dotv' + phidot(kk)]; 
        alpha_dn_dotv = [alpha_dn_dotv; eta_dn_dotv' + phidot(kk)]; 
         
        %Record the number of cones 
        acount = [acount length(eta_up)]; 
        acountv = [acountv length(eta_upv)]; 
    end 
end 
violation = max(violation1); 
  
%Check and correct for horizontal cone overlap 
overlap_reg=[]; 
if ~isempty(alpha_up), 
    alpha_up_P = wrap_pos(alpha_up); 
    alpha_dn_N = wrap_neg(alpha_dn); 
    alpha_up_N = wrap_neg(alpha_up); 
    alpha_dn_P = wrap_pos(alpha_dn); 
    [alfs aidx]=sort(alpha_up_P); 
    alpha_up_P=alpha_up_P(aidx); 
    alpha_dn_N=alpha_dn_N(aidx); 
    alpha_up_N=alpha_up_N(aidx); 
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    alpha_dn_P=alpha_dn_P(aidx); 
    alpha_up=alpha_up(aidx); 
    alpha_dn=alpha_dn(aidx); 
    if sum(acount)>1, 
        for nn = 1:sum(acount)-1, 
            mmsweep=nn+1:sum(acount); 
            for mm = mmsweep, 
                %Correct for Quadrant 1 and 4 overlap/non-overlap and 
                % zero boundary 
                if alpha_dn_N(nn)>alpha_up_N(nn) && 
alpha_dn_N(nn)~=alpha_up_N(mm), 
                    alpha_dn_N(nn)=alpha_dn_N(nn)-2*pi; 
                    alpha_dn_P(nn)=alpha_dn_P(nn)-2*pi; 
                end 
                if alpha_dn_N(mm)>alpha_up_N(mm) && 
alpha_dn_N(mm)~=alpha_up_N(nn), 
                    alpha_dn_N(mm)=alpha_dn_N(mm)-2*pi; 
                    alpha_dn_P(mm)=alpha_dn_P(mm)-2*pi; 
                end 
                if alpha_up_N(nn)>alpha_dn_N(mm) && 
alpha_dn_P(mm)<alpha_up_P(nn), 
                    overlap_reg=[overlap_reg;nn mm]; 
                    [temp loc]=max([alpha_up_P(nn) alpha_up_P(mm)]); 
                    if loc==1, 
                        alpha_up(mm)=alpha_up(nn); 
                        alpha_up_dot(mm)=alpha_up_dot(nn); 
                        %%ALS 
                        alpha_up_P(mm)=alpha_up_P(nn); 
                        alpha_up_N(mm)=alpha_up_N(nn); 
                        %% 
                    elseif loc==2, 
                        alpha_up(nn)=alpha_up(mm); 
                        alpha_up_dot(nn)=alpha_up_dot(mm); 
                        %%ALS 
                        alpha_up_P(nn)=alpha_up_P(mm); 
                        alpha_up_N(nn)=alpha_up_N(mm); 
                        %% 
                    end 
                    [temp1 loc1]=min([alpha_dn_N(nn) alpha_dn_N(mm)]); 
                    if loc1==1, 
                        alpha_dn(mm)=alpha_dn(nn); 
                        alpha_dn_dot(mm)=alpha_dn_dot(nn); 
                        %%ALS 
                        alpha_dn_N(mm)=alpha_dn_N(nn); 
                        alpha_dn_P(mm)=alpha_dn_P(nn); 
                        %% 
                    elseif loc1==2, 
                        alpha_dn(nn)=alpha_dn(mm); 
                        alpha_dn_dot(nn)=alpha_dn_dot(mm); 
                        %%ALS 
                        alpha_dn_N(nn)=alpha_dn_N(mm); 
                        alpha_dn_P(nn)=alpha_dn_P(mm); 
                        %% 
                    end 
                end 
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            end 
        end 
    end 
end 
%Check and correct for vertical cone overlap 
overlapv_reg=[]; 
if ~isempty(alpha_upv), 
    alpha_up_Pv = wrap_pos(alpha_upv); 
    alpha_dn_Nv = wrap_neg(alpha_dnv); 
    alpha_up_Nv = wrap_neg(alpha_upv); 
    alpha_dn_Pv = wrap_pos(alpha_dnv); 
    [alfsv aidxv]=sort(alpha_up_Pv); 
    alpha_up_Pv=alpha_up_Pv(aidxv); 
    alpha_dn_Nv=alpha_dn_Nv(aidxv); 
    alpha_up_Nv=alpha_up_Nv(aidxv); 
    alpha_dn_Pv=alpha_dn_Pv(aidxv); 
    alpha_upv=alpha_upv(aidxv); 
    alpha_dnv=alpha_dnv(aidxv); 
    if sum(acountv)>1, 
        for nn = 1:sum(acountv)-1, 
            mmsweep=nn+1:sum(acountv); 
            for mm = mmsweep, 
                %Correct for Quadrant 1 and 4 overlap/non-overlap and 
                % zero boundary 
                if alpha_dn_Nv(nn)>alpha_up_Nv(nn) && 
alpha_dn_Nv(nn)~=alpha_up_Nv(mm), 
                    alpha_dn_Nv(nn)=alpha_dn_Nv(nn)-2*pi; 
                    alpha_dn_Pv(nn)=alpha_dn_Pv(nn)-2*pi; 
                end 
                if alpha_dn_Nv(mm)>alpha_up_Nv(mm) && 
alpha_dn_Nv(mm)~=alpha_up_Nv(nn), 
                    alpha_dn_Nv(mm)=alpha_dn_Nv(mm)-2*pi; 
                    alpha_dn_Pv(mm)=alpha_dn_Pv(mm)-2*pi; 
                end 
                if alpha_up_Nv(nn)>alpha_dn_Nv(mm) && 
alpha_dn_Pv(mm)<alpha_up_Pv(nn), 
                    overlapv_reg=[overlapv_reg;nn mm]; 
                    [temp loc]=max([alpha_up_Pv(nn) alpha_up_Pv(mm)]); 
                    if loc==1, 
                        alpha_upv(mm)=alpha_upv(nn); 
                        alpha_up_dotv(mm)=alpha_up_dotv(nn); 
                        %%ALS 
                        alpha_up_Pv(mm)=alpha_up_Pv(nn); 
                        alpha_up_Nv(mm)=alpha_up_Nv(nn); 
                        %% 
                    elseif loc==2, 
                        alpha_upv(nn)=alpha_upv(mm); 
                        alpha_up_dotv(nn)=alpha_up_dotv(mm); 
                        %%ALS 
                        alpha_up_Pv(nn)=alpha_up_Pv(mm); 
                        alpha_up_Nv(nn)=alpha_up_Nv(mm); 
                        %% 
                    end 
                    [temp1 loc1]=min([alpha_dn_Nv(nn) 
alpha_dn_Nv(mm)]); 
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                    if loc1==1, 
                        alpha_dnv(mm)=alpha_dnv(nn); 
                        alpha_dn_dotv(mm)=alpha_dn_dotv(nn); 
                        %%ALS 
                        alpha_dn_Nv(mm)=alpha_dn_Nv(nn); 
                        alpha_dn_Pv(mm)=alpha_dn_Pv(nn); 
                        %% 
                    elseif loc1==2, 
                        alpha_dnv(nn)=alpha_dnv(mm); 
                        alpha_dn_dotv(nn)=alpha_dn_dotv(mm); 
                        %%ALS 
                        alpha_dn_Nv(nn)=alpha_dn_Nv(mm); 
                        alpha_dn_Pv(nn)=alpha_dn_Pv(mm); 
                        %% 
                    end 
                end 
            end 
        end 
    end 
end 
alpha_up_p=[];alpha_dn_p=[];alpha_up_pv=[];alpha_dn_pv=[]; 
alpha_up_p = alpha_up; 
alpha_dn_p = alpha_dn; 
alpha_up_pv = alpha_upv; 
alpha_dn_pv = alpha_dnv; 
  
%horizontal evasive maneuver 
for jj=1:length(alpha_up), 
    alpha_up_wrap = wrap_mpi2pi(alpha_up(jj)); 
    alpha_dn_wrap = wrap_mpi2pi(alpha_dn(jj)); 
    alpha_up_norm = alpha_up_wrap-alpha; 
    alpha_dn_norm = alpha_dn_wrap-alpha; 
    if alpha_up_norm<alpha_dn_norm, 
        alpha_dn_norm=alpha_dn_norm-2*pi; 
    end 
    % 
    if flag == 0, 
        if alpha_up_dot(jj)>=0 && alpha_dn_dot(jj)<=0, 
            if abs(alpha_up_dot(jj))<=abs(alpha_dn_dot(jj)), 
                angle=alpha_dn(jj); 
                angle_dot = alpha_dn_dot(jj); flag=2; 
            else 
                angle=alpha_up(jj); 
                angle_dot = alpha_up_dot(jj); flag=1; 
            end 
        elseif alpha_up_dot(jj)<=0 && alpha_dn_dot(jj)>=0, 
            if abs(alpha_up_dot(jj))<=abs(alpha_dn_dot(jj)), 
                angle=alpha_dn(jj); 
                angle_dot = alpha_dn_dot(jj); flag=2; 
            else 
                angle=alpha_up(jj); 
                angle_dot = alpha_up_dot(jj); flag=1; 
            end 
        elseif alpha_up_dot(jj)>=0 && alpha_dn_dot(jj)>=0, 
            if abs(alpha_up_dot(jj))<=abs(alpha_dn_dot(jj)), 
 
179 
                angle=alpha_up(jj); 
                angle_dot = alpha_up_dot(jj); flag=1; 
            else 
                angle=alpha_dn(jj); 
                angle_dot = alpha_dn_dot(jj); flag=2; 
            end 
        elseif alpha_up_dot(jj)<=0 && alpha_dn_dot(jj)<=0, 
            if abs(alpha_up_dot(jj))<=abs(alpha_dn_dot(jj)), 
                angle=alpha_up(jj); 
                angle_dot = alpha_up_dot(jj); flag=1; 
            else 
                angle=alpha_dn(jj); 
                angle_dot = alpha_dn_dot(jj); flag=2; 
            end 
        end 
    elseif flag==1, 
        angle=alpha_up(jj); 
        angle_dot = alpha_up_dot(jj); 
    elseif flag==2, 
        angle=alpha_dn(jj); 
        angle_dot = alpha_dn_dot(jj); 
    end 
    angle_dot_vec=angle_dot; 
    % 
    if ((alpha_up_norm >=0.0) && (alpha_dn_norm<=0)) ||... 
            ((alpha_up_norm <= -3*pi/2) && (alpha_dn_norm <=-2*pi)) 
||... 
            ((alpha_up_norm >= 2*pi) && (alpha_dn_norm >=3*pi/2)), 
        evasion = 1; 
        % 
        % proportional gain 
        N = 2; 
        % acceleration command 
        a = N*V_O*angle_dot; 
        % UAS accleration command components 
        vdot(jj) = -a * sin(angle - alpha); 
        alphadot(jj) = -a/V_O * cos(angle - alpha); 
  
    else 
        alphadot(jj) = 0.0; 
        vdot(jj) = 0.0; 
    end 
  
end 
  
%vertical evasive maneuver 
for jj=1:length(alpha_upv), 
    alpha_up_wrapv = wrap_mpi2pi(alpha_upv(jj)); 
    alpha_dn_wrapv = wrap_mpi2pi(alpha_dnv(jj)); 
    alpha_up_normv = alpha_up_wrapv-gamma; 
    alpha_dn_normv = alpha_dn_wrapv-gamma; 
    if alpha_up_normv<alpha_dn_normv, 
        alpha_dn_normv=alpha_dn_normv-2*pi; 
    end 
    % 
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    if flagv == 0, 
        if alpha_up_dotv(jj)>=0 && alpha_dn_dotv(jj)<=0, 
            if abs(alpha_up_dotv(jj))<=abs(alpha_dn_dotv(jj)), 
                anglev=alpha_upv(jj); 
                angle_dotv = alpha_up_dotv(jj); flagv=1; 
            else 
                anglev=alpha_dnv(jj); 
                angle_dotv = alpha_dn_dotv(jj); flagv=2; 
            end 
        elseif alpha_up_dotv(jj)<=0 && alpha_dn_dotv(jj)>=0, 
            if abs(alpha_up_dotv(jj))<=abs(alpha_dn_dotv(jj)), 
                anglev=alpha_dnv(jj); 
                angle_dotv = alpha_dn_dotv(jj); flagv=2; 
            else 
                anglev=alpha_upv(jj); 
                angle_dotv = alpha_up_dotv(jj); flagv=1; 
            end 
        elseif alpha_up_dotv(jj)>=0 && alpha_dn_dotv(jj)>=0, 
            if abs(alpha_up_dotv(jj))<=abs(alpha_dn_dotv(jj)), 
                anglev=alpha_dnv(jj); 
                angle_dotv = alpha_dn_dotv(jj); flagv=2; 
            else 
                anglev=alpha_upv(jj); 
                angle_dotv = alpha_up_dotv(jj); flagv=1; 
            end 
        elseif alpha_up_dotv(jj)<=0 && alpha_dn_dotv(jj)<=0, 
            if abs(alpha_up_dotv(jj))<=abs(alpha_dn_dotv(jj)), 
                anglev=alpha_upv(jj); 
                angle_dotv = alpha_up_dotv(jj); flagv=1; 
            else 
                anglev=alpha_dnv(jj); 
                angle_dotv = alpha_dn_dotv(jj); flagv=2; 
            end 
        end 
    elseif flagv==1, 
        anglev=alpha_upv(jj); 
        angle_dotv = alpha_up_dotv(jj); 
    elseif flagv==2, 
        anglev=alpha_dnv(jj); 
        angle_dotv = alpha_dn_dotv(jj); 
    end 
    angle_dot_vecv=angle_dotv; 
    %ALS 
    anglev=wrap_mpi2pi(anglev); 
    % 
    if (alpha_up_normv >=0.0) && (alpha_dn_normv<=0), 
        evasionv = 1; 
        % 
        % proportional gain 
        N = 2; 
        % acceleration command 
        a = N*V_O*angle_dotv; 
        % UAS accleration command components 
        vdotv(jj) = -a * sin(anglev - gamma); 
        gammadot(jj) = -a/V_O * cos(anglev - gamma); 
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    else 
        gammadot(jj) = 0.0; 
        vdotv(jj) = 0.0; 
    end 
  
end 
  
if isempty(alpha_up), 
    alphadot=[]; 
    vdot=[]; 
end 
if isempty(alpha_upv), 
    gammadot=[]; 
    vdotv=[]; 
end 
  
%Choose command from vector of potential commands 
if evasion == 1 && evasionv ==1 && norm([alphadot vdot gammadot 
vdotv])~=0, 
    %Conflict Properties 
    conflict = 1; 
    cflct_cone = find(alphadot~=0); 
    cflct_int = []; 
    for ww=1:length(cflct_cone), 
        for xx=1:length(acount), 
            if cflct_cone(ww)<=sum(acount(1:xx)), 
                if isempty(cflct_int) || xx~=cflct_int(end), 
                    cflct_int=[cflct_int xx]; %record index of intruder 
                    break; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
        if cflct_int(end)==length(acount), 
            break; %break loop if there is already a conflict with the 
last intruder  
        end 
    end 
    cflct_conev = find(gammadot~=0); 
    cflct_intv = []; 
    for ww=1:length(cflct_conev), 
        for xx=1:length(acountv), 
            if cflct_conev(ww)<=sum(acountv(1:xx)), 
                if isempty(cflct_intv) || xx~=cflct_intv(end), 
                    cflct_intv=[cflct_intv xx]; %record index of 
intruder 
                    break; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
        if cflct_intv(end)==length(acountv), 
            break; %break loop if there is already a conflict with the 
last intruder  
        end 
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    end 
     
    %Commands 
    sad=sum(alphadot); 
    ssad=sign(sad); 
    sadv=sum(gammadot); 
    ssadv=sign(sadv); 
    if ssad>0, 
        i1=find(alphadot>0); 
        [mad,imad]=min(alphadot(i1)); 
        i11=i1(imad); 
        vdotc1 = vdot(i11); 
        alphadotc = alphadot(i11); 
    elseif ssad<0, 
        i2=find(alphadot<0); 
        [mad2,imad2]=max(alphadot(i2)); 
        i22=i2(imad2); 
        vdotc1 = vdot(i22); 
        alphadotc = alphadot(i22); 
    else 
        vdotc1 = 0.0; 
        alphadotc = 0.0; 
        flag=0; 
        evasion=0; 
    end 
    if ssadv>0, 
        i1=find(gammadot>0); 
        [mad,imad]=min(gammadot(i1)); 
        i11=i1(imad); 
        if ~isempty(i11) 
            vdotc2 = vdotv(i11); 
            gammadotc = gammadot(i11)-vdotc1/V_O*sin(gamma); 
        end 
    elseif ssadv<0, 
        i2=find(gammadot<0); 
        [mad2,imad2]=max(gammadot(i2)); 
        i22=i2(imad2); 
        if ~isempty(i22) 
            vdotc2 = vdotv(i22); 
            gammadotc = gammadot(i22)-vdotc1/V_O*sin(gamma); 
        end 
    else 
        vdotc2 = 0.0; 
        gammadotc = -vdotc1/V_O*sin(gamma); 
        flagv=0; 
        evasionv=0; 
    end 
    vdotc = vdotc1*cos(gamma) + vdotc2; 
else 
    conflict = 0; 
    cflct_int = []; 
    cflct_intv = []; 
    vdotc = 0.0; 
    alphadotc = 0.0; 
    gammadotc = 0.0; 
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    evasion = 0; 
    evasionv = 0; 
    flag=0; 
    flagv=0; 
end 
  
% cc_plot(Ni,r,x_O,y_O,z_O,V_O,alpha,gamma,x_F,y_F,z_F,V_F,... 
%     
beta,chi,R,Rv,VO,violation,x_ccv,y_ccv,z_ccv,alpha_up_p,alpha_dn_p,... 
%     alpha_up_pv,alpha_dn_pv,sensvol,acount,acountv) 
  
%Convert Collision Cone commands to Aircraft commands 
psidotc=-alphadotc; 
gamdotc=gammadotc; 
acc=vdotc; 
 
F_COLLISIONCONE4 
 
function [eta_up,eta_dn,eta_up_dot,eta_dn_dot] = 
f_collisioncone4(mu,nu,p,mudot,nudot,pdot) 
  
% FUNCTION f_collisioncone2 
% 
% [alpha_up,alpha_dn] = f_collisioncone2(mu,nu,p,mudot,nudot,pdot) 
% 
% INPUTS: 
%  mu = beta - theta0 
%  nu = V_A/V_B 
%  p  = R/sqrt(r0^2-R^2) - For Circular Object 
%     = abs(tan(psi0/2)) - For Irregular Shaped Object 
%  mudot = betadot - theta0dot 
%  nudot = A_A/V_B - nu*A_F/V_F 
%  pdot = -Vr*p^3*r0/(R^2) 
% 
% OUTPUTS: 
%  eta_up - upper angular collision cone limit 
%  eta_dn - lower angular collision cone limit 
%  
% This function calculates the angular limits of the collision cone 
from  
% the point A to the object B. There can be a double collision cone 
% depending on the geometry of the encounter. In this case, there will 
be 
% two sets of angular limits. 
  
A = (p*cos(mu) + sin(mu))/sqrt(p^2+1); 
zeta = asin(p/sqrt(p^2+1)); 
Atilde = (p*cos(mu) - sin(mu))/sqrt(p^2+1); 
zetatilde = pi - zeta; 
  
Adot = pdot*(cos(zeta)*cos(mu) - 
cos(zeta)^2*sin(zeta)*(p*cos(mu)+sin(mu))) + ... 
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    mudot*cos(zeta)*(cos(mu)-p*sin(mu)); 
zetadot = pdot*cos(zeta)^2; 
Atildedot = pdot*(-cos(zetatilde)*cos(mu) - 
cos(zetatilde)^2*sin(zetatilde)*(p*cos(mu)-sin(mu))) + ... 
    mudot*cos(zetatilde)*(cos(mu)+p*sin(mu)); 
zetatildedot = -zetadot; 
  
% Collision Cone Boundaries 
% Satisfy (Vr0 < 0) 
if cos(mu)/nu >= 1, 
    N1_up = []; 
    N1_dn = []; 
    %no cone 
    eta_up = []; 
    eta_dn = []; 
    eta_up_dot = []; 
    eta_dn_dot = []; 
    return; 
elseif (cos(mu)/nu >= -1 && cos(mu)/nu < 1), 
    N1_up = acos(cos(mu)/nu); 
    N1_dn = -acos(cos(mu)/nu); 
elseif cos(mu)/nu < -1, 
    N1_up = 2*pi; 
    N1_dn = 0; 
end 
% Satisfy (Vth0^2 <= p^2*Vr0^2) -> (Vth0 <= -p*Vr0) 
if A/nu > 1, 
    N21_up = []; 
    N21_dn = []; 
    N21_up_dot = []; 
    N21_dn_dot = []; 
elseif (A/nu >= 0 && A/nu <= 1), 
    N21_up = pi - asin(A/nu) - zeta; 
    N21_dn = asin(A/nu) - zeta; 
    N21_up_dot = tan(pi-N21_up-zeta)*nudot/nu-Adot/(cos(pi-N21_up-
zeta)*nu)-zetadot; 
    N21_dn_dot = Adot/(cos(N21_dn+zeta)*nu)-tan(N21_dn+zeta)*nudot/nu-
zetadot; 
elseif (A/nu > -1 && A/nu < 0), 
    N21_up = -pi - asin(A/nu) - zeta; 
    N21_dn = asin(A/nu) - zeta; 
    N21_up_dot = tan(-pi-N21_up-zeta)*nudot/nu-Adot/(cos(-pi-N21_up-
zeta)*nu)-zetadot; 
    N21_dn_dot = Adot/(cos(N21_dn+zeta)*nu)-tan(N21_dn+zeta)*nudot/nu-
zetadot; 
elseif A/nu <= -1, 
    N21_up = 2*pi; 
    N21_dn = 0; 
    N21_up_dot = 0; 
    N21_dn_dot = 0; 
end 
% Satisfy (Vth0^2 <= p^2*Vr0^2) -> (p*Vr0 <= Vth0) 
if Atilde/nu > 1, 
    N22_up = []; 
    N22_dn = []; 
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    N22_up_dot = []; 
    N22_dn_dot = []; 
elseif (Atilde/nu >= 0 && Atilde/nu <= 1), 
    N22_up = pi - asin(Atilde/nu) - zetatilde; 
    N22_dn = asin(Atilde/nu) - zetatilde; 
    N22_up_dot = tan(pi-N22_up-zetatilde)*nudot/nu-Atildedot/(cos(pi-
N22_up-zetatilde)*nu)-zetatildedot; 
    N22_dn_dot = Atildedot/(cos(N22_dn+zetatilde)*nu)-
tan(N22_dn+zetatilde)*nudot/nu-zetatildedot; 
elseif (Atilde/nu > -1 && Atilde/nu < 0), 
    N22_up = -pi - asin(Atilde/nu) - zetatilde; 
    N22_dn = asin(Atilde/nu) - zetatilde; 
    N22_up_dot = tan(-pi-N22_up-zetatilde)*nudot/nu-Atildedot/(cos(-pi-
N22_up-zetatilde)*nu)-zetatildedot; 
    N22_dn_dot = Atildedot/(cos(N22_dn+zetatilde)*nu)-
tan(N22_dn+zetatilde)*nudot/nu-zetatildedot; 
elseif Atilde/nu <= -1, 
    N22_up = 2*pi; 
    N22_dn = 0; 
    N22_up_dot = 0; 
    N22_dn_dot = 0; 
end 
% N21 |-| N22 
if ((A/nu > 1) || (Atilde/nu >1)), 
    N2_up = []; 
    N2_dn = []; 
    N2_up_dot = []; 
    N2_dn_dot = []; 
elseif (A/nu > -1 && A/nu <= 1) && (Atilde/nu > -1 && Atilde/nu <= 1), 
    if (nu >= 1) && (round(zeta*1e10)/1e10 >= 
round((0.5*abs(asin(A/nu)+asin(Atilde/nu)))*1e10)/1e10), 
        N2_up = N22_up; 
        N2_dn = N21_dn; 
        N2_up_dot = N22_up_dot; 
        N2_dn_dot = N21_dn_dot; 
    elseif (nu < 1) && ((zeta >= 0) && (zeta <= 
0.5*abs(asin(A/nu)+asin(Atilde/nu)))), 
        N2_up = [N22_up N21_up]; 
        N2_dn = [N21_dn N22_dn]; 
        N2_up_dot = [N22_up_dot N21_up_dot]; 
        N2_dn_dot = [N21_dn_dot N22_dn_dot]; 
    else 
        N2_up = []; 
        N2_dn = []; 
        N2_up_dot = []; 
        N2_dn_dot = []; 
    end 
else 
    if (A/nu <= -1) && ((Atilde/nu <= 1) && (Atilde/nu > -1)), 
        N2_up = N22_up; 
        N2_dn = N22_dn; 
        N2_up_dot = N22_up_dot; 
        N2_dn_dot = N22_dn_dot; 
    elseif (Atilde/nu <= -1) && ((A/nu <= 1) && (A/nu > -1)), 
        N2_up = N21_up; 
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        N2_dn = N21_dn; 
        N2_up_dot = N21_up_dot; 
        N2_dn_dot = N21_dn_dot; 
    elseif (A/nu <= -1) && (Atilde/nu <= -1), 
        N2_up = 2*pi; 
        N2_dn = 0; 
        N2_up_dot = 0; 
        N2_dn_dot = 0; 
    end 
end 
  
eta_up = N2_up; 
eta_dn = N2_dn; 
eta_up_dot = N2_up_dot; 
eta_dn_dot = N2_dn_dot; 
  
 
WRAP_MPI2PI 
 
function [angleOUT] = wrap_mpi2pi(angleIN) 
for ii=1:length(angleIN), 
    if angleIN(ii)>pi, 
        angleOUT(ii) = angleIN(ii) - 2*pi; 
    elseif angleIN(ii)<-pi, 
        angleOUT(ii) = angleIN(ii) + 2*pi; 
    else 
        angleOUT(ii) = angleIN(ii); 
    end 
end 
 
 
WRAP_NEG 
 
function [angleOUT] = wrap_neg(angleIN) 
angleOUT=angleIN; 
for ii=1:length(angleIN), 
    while angleOUT(ii)>0, 
        angleOUT(ii) = angleOUT(ii) - 2*pi;  
    end 
end 
 
 
WRAP_POS 
 
function [angleOUT] = wrap_pos(angleIN) 
angleOUT=angleIN; 
for ii=1:length(angleIN), 
    while angleOUT(ii)<0, 
        angleOUT(ii) = angleOUT(ii) + 2*pi;  
    end 
end 
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CC_PLOT 
 
function cc_plot(Ni,r,x_O,y_O,z_O,V_O,alpha,gamma,x_F,y_F,z_F,V_F,... 
    
beta,chi,R,Rv,VO,violation,x_ccv,y_ccv,z_ccv,alpha_up_p,alpha_dn_p,... 
    alpha_up_pv,alpha_dn_pv,sensvol,acount,acountv) 
  
persistent counter 
global Ni_loop 
if isempty(counter), 
    figure(1) 
    clf 
    counter=1; 
end 
if counter<=Ni_loop, 
    figure(1) 
    hold on 
    counter=counter+1; 
else 
    figure(1) 
    clf 
    hold on 
    counter=2; 
end 
  
%Calculate velocity components 
Vx_O = V_O*cos(alpha)*cos(gamma); 
Vy_O = V_O*sin(alpha)*cos(gamma); 
Vz_O = V_O*sin(gamma); 
Vx_F = V_F.*cos(beta).*cos(chi); 
Vy_F = V_F.*sin(beta).*cos(chi); 
Vz_F = V_F.*sin(chi); 
  
anglecircle = linspace(0,2*pi,200); 
  
xcircle = 
x_F*ones(1,length(anglecircle))+R*ones(Ni,1)*cos(anglecircle); 
ycircle = 
y_F*ones(1,length(anglecircle))+R*ones(Ni,1)*sin(anglecircle); 
zcircle = z_F*ones(1,length(anglecircle)); 
xcirclev = 
(x_ccv+x_O)*ones(1,length(anglecircle))+Rv.*ones(Ni,1).*cos(alpha)*cos(
anglecircle); 
ycirclev = 
(y_ccv+y_O)*ones(1,length(anglecircle))+Rv.*ones(Ni,1).*sin(alpha)*cos(
anglecircle); 
zcirclev = 
(z_ccv+z_O)*ones(1,length(anglecircle))+Rv.*ones(Ni,1)*sin(anglecircle)
; 
  
llcount=1; 
llcountv=1; 
% figure(1) 
% clf 
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% hold on 
view(-30,30) 
%view(0,90) 
%view(0,0) 
for kk = 1:Ni, 
    if (~isempty(alpha_up_p) || ~isempty(alpha_up_pv)) && violation == 
0, 
        plot3([x_O x_F(kk)],[y_O y_F(kk)],[z_O z_F(kk)],'b-*') 
        quiver3([x_O x_F(kk)],[y_O y_F(kk)],[z_O z_F(kk)],[Vx_O 
Vx_F(kk)],[Vy_O Vy_F(kk)],[Vz_O Vz_F(kk)],'AutoScale','off') 
        if sensvol(kk) == 1; 
            
hdl1=plot3(xcircle(kk,:),ycircle(kk,:),zcircle(kk,:)+VO,'k');set(hdl1,'
Color',[212 208 200]/255) 
            hdl2=plot3(xcircle(kk,:),ycircle(kk,:),zcircle(kk,:)-
VO,'k');set(hdl2,'Color',[212 208 200]/255) 
            
hdl3=plot3(xcirclev(kk,:),ycirclev(kk,:),zcirclev(kk,:),'k');set(hdl3,'
Color',[212 208 200]/255) 
        else 
            plot3(xcircle(kk,:),ycircle(kk,:),zcircle(kk,:)+VO,'k') 
            plot3(xcircle(kk,:),ycircle(kk,:),zcircle(kk,:)-VO,'k') 
            plot3(xcirclev(kk,:),ycirclev(kk,:),zcirclev(kk,:),'k') 
        end 
        plot3(x_ccv+x_O,y_ccv+y_O,z_ccv+z_O,'c*') 
        for ll=llcount:acount(kk)+llcount-1, 
            plot3([x_O r(kk)*cos(alpha_dn_p(ll))+x_O],[y_O 
r(kk)*sin(alpha_dn_p(ll))+y_O],[z_O z_O],'r') 
            plot3([x_O r(kk)*cos(alpha_up_p(ll))+x_O],[y_O 
r(kk)*sin(alpha_up_p(ll))+y_O],[z_O z_O],'r') 
            
quiver3(r(kk)/2.*cos(alpha_up_p(ll))+x_O,r(kk)/2.*sin(alpha_up_p(ll))+y
_O,z_O,sin(alpha_up_p(ll)),-
cos(alpha_up_p(ll)),0,'g','AutoScale','off') 
            
quiver3(r(kk)/2.*cos(alpha_dn_p(ll))+x_O,r(kk)/2.*sin(alpha_dn_p(ll))+y
_O,z_O,-
sin(alpha_dn_p(ll)),cos(alpha_dn_p(ll)),0,'g','AutoScale','off') 
            llcount=llcount+1; 
        end 
        for ll=llcountv:acountv(kk)+llcountv-1, 
            plot3([x_O r(kk)*cos(alpha_dn_pv(ll))*cos(alpha)+x_O],[y_O 
r(kk)*cos(alpha_dn_pv(ll))*sin(alpha)+y_O],[z_O 
r(kk)*sin(alpha_dn_pv(ll))+z_O],'r') 
            plot3([x_O r(kk)*cos(alpha_up_pv(ll))*cos(alpha)+x_O],[y_O 
r(kk)*cos(alpha_up_pv(ll))*sin(alpha)+y_O],[z_O 
r(kk)*sin(alpha_up_pv(ll))+z_O],'r') 
            
quiver3(r(kk)/2.*cos(alpha_up_pv(ll))*cos(alpha)+x_O,r(kk)/2.*cos(alpha
_up_pv(ll))*sin(alpha)+y_O,r(kk)/2.*sin(alpha_up_pv(ll))+z_O,sin(alpha_
up_pv(ll))*cos(alpha),sin(alpha_up_pv(ll))*sin(alpha),-
cos(alpha_up_pv(ll)),'g','AutoScale','off') 
            
quiver3(r(kk)/2.*cos(alpha_dn_pv(ll))*cos(alpha)+x_O,r(kk)/2.*cos(alpha
_dn_pv(ll))*sin(alpha)+y_O,r(kk)/2.*sin(alpha_dn_pv(ll))+z_O,-
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sin(alpha_dn_pv(ll))*cos(alpha),-
sin(alpha_dn_pv(ll))*sin(alpha),cos(alpha_dn_pv(ll)),'g','AutoScale','o
ff') 
            llcountv=llcountv+1; 
        end 
         
    elseif violation == 1, 
        plot3([x_O x_F(kk)],[y_O y_F(kk)],[z_O z_F(kk)],'r-*') 
        quiver3([x_O x_F(kk)],[y_O y_F(kk)],[z_O z_F(kk)],[Vx_O 
Vx_F(kk)],[Vy_O Vy_F(kk)],[Vz_O Vz_F(kk)],'AutoScale','off') 
        plot3(xcircle(kk,:),ycircle(kk,:),zcircle(kk,:)+VO,'r') 
        plot3(xcircle(kk,:),ycircle(kk,:),zcircle(kk,:)-VO,'r') 
        plot3(xcirclev(kk,:),ycirclev(kk,:),zcirclev(kk,:),'r') 
        plot3(x_ccv+x_O,y_ccv+y_O,z_ccv+z_O,'c*') 
         
    else 
        plot3([x_O x_F(kk)],[y_O y_F(kk)],[z_O z_F(kk)],'b-*') 
        quiver3([x_O x_F(kk)],[y_O y_F(kk)],[z_O z_F(kk)],[Vx_O 
Vx_F(kk)],[Vy_O Vy_F(kk)],[Vz_O Vz_F(kk)],'AutoScale','off') 
        if sensvol(kk) == 1; 
            
hdl1=plot3(xcircle(kk,:),ycircle(kk,:),zcircle(kk,:)+VO,'k');set(hdl1,'
Color',[212 208 200]/255) 
            hdl2=plot3(xcircle(kk,:),ycircle(kk,:),zcircle(kk,:)-
VO,'k');set(hdl2,'Color',[212 208 200]/255) 
            
hdl3=plot3(xcirclev(kk,:),ycirclev(kk,:),zcirclev(kk,:),'k');set(hdl3,'
Color',[212 208 200]/255) 
        else 
            plot3(xcircle(kk,:),ycircle(kk,:),zcircle(kk,:)+VO,'k') 
            plot3(xcircle(kk,:),ycircle(kk,:),zcircle(kk,:)-VO,'k') 
            plot3(xcirclev(kk,:),ycirclev(kk,:),zcirclev(kk,:),'k') 
        end 
        plot3(x_ccv+x_O,y_ccv+y_O,z_ccv+z_O,'c*') 
         
    end 
end 
hold off 
plotlim=9; 
%axis([x_O-plotlim x_O+plotlim y_O-plotlim*8/10 y_O+plotlim*8/10 z_O-
plotlim/3 z_O+plotlim/3]) 
axis equal 
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